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ABSTRACT 
As technological advances are made in the design of smart sensors, the issue of privacy in 
public places, first discussed by Warren and Brandeis in 1890, becomes an important 
topic for law and policy. This paper examines issues of privacy that are impacted when 
an individual’s image is recorded by a video-based wearable computer, analyzed using 
facial recognition software, and uploaded to the internet. While the Constitutional basis 
of search and seizure law for individual’s placed under video surveillance is reviewed, a 
particular focus of the paper is on a less investigated but emerging area of concern, the 
video recording and facial recognition of individuals in public places by non-government 
actors. The paper presents an overview of the law as applied to the use of video systems 
for surveillance, reviews facial recognition techniques, and discusses cases arising under 
state law dealing with video recording of individuals in public places. The paper 
concludes with recommendations for the protection of privacy calling for the legislation 
enactment of an information privacy statute to cover the disclosure of private information 
for individuals filmed by wearable computers equipped with facial recognition software. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines privacy issues that occur when video-based wearable 
computer systems equipped with facial recognition software are used to film an 
individual in a public place. Video-based wearable computers pose a significant threat to 
an individual’s privacy- not only can wearable computers with facial recognition 
software record and analyze a person’s face, they can be used to upload an image to the 
internet where it may be viewed by anyone with access to a computer and internet 
connection.  Once the identity of a person is known, information about the person that is 
accessible on the internet can be presented with the individual’s face.2 The ability to film, 
identify, and track an individual within a public place, along with the ability to pair 
personal information to an individual’s image, has prompted some legal scholars into 
calling for a new statute, covering information privacy, to provide relief for people who 
have had their privacy violated by computing and communications technology.3
The Supreme Court has broadly defined privacy as “the individual’s control of 
information concerning his or her person,” that is, the right to control the dissemination 
of information about oneself.4 Similarly, information privacy involves an individual's 
 
2 See generally Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1193 
(1998); Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public Sphere, 62 Wash. & Lee 
L. Rev. 93 (2005). Once an individual’s image is identified and uploaded to the internet, various items of 
personal information available on computer databases can be pieced together, resulting in a 
comprehensive picture of an individual. 
3 Kang, id. (discussing the concept of an information privacy statute).  
4 U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989). 
3personal information and his ability to control that information.5 The basic argument for 
information privacy stems from the concern that individuals have a right to exert some 
control over who has access to their personal information, and for what purpose.6 As 
expressed by a leading scholar on the topic, examples of personal information includes 
data assigned to an individual, such as their social security number, address, or telephone 
number; and information about an individual that is generated on a day-to-day basis, such 
as records of bank transactions, credit card purchases, phone calls, and medical 
treatments.7 Other personal information may be school or medical records, employment 
histories, arrest records, and tracking information, as well as personal likes and dislikes. 
Essentially, this collection of information not only defines who a person is but in many 
cases describes the intimate details of a person’s life; therefore to allow such information 
to be used without an individual’s consent, especially if paired to a person’s image posted 
on the internet, would represent an unwarranted and unprecedented invasion into a 
person’s privacy.  
As society becomes dependent on computer databases and electronic record-
keeping, an individual's ability to control who has access to his personal information is 
becoming even more tenuous.8 In the age of the internet and wirelessly networked 
wearable computers, the inability to control the dissemination and use of personal 
information gives rise to the issue of information privacy which may be exacerbated by 
video-based systems with facial recognition software. Past thoughts on information 
 
5 See generally Kang, supra note 2; Kang & Cuff, supra note 2. 
6 Id.
7 Thomas Kearns, Technology and the Right to Privacy, The Convergence of Surveillance and Information 
Privacy Concerns, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rights J. 975 (1999). 
8 See generally Sheri A. Alpert, Privacy and Intelligent Highways: Finding the Right Way, 11 Santa Clara 
Computer & High Tech, L.J. 97, 106-107 (1995). 
4privacy indicated that the concept was tied to the concept of anonymity,9 that is, the 
control of personal information.10 It was not thought to address an individual's actions 
and movements. However, since an individual’s image may be recorded as they move 
about a public place, their identity known and analyzed as a result of facial recognition 
software, and their image uploaded to the internet, this article argues for an expansion of 
the concept of information privacy to include the actions and movements of an individual 
when paired to the presentation of personal facts about the individual.   
One concern resulting from the ability to identify a person and track their 
movements using wearable computers is that a person’s right to freely travel and 
associate may be severely impacted and curtailed. This is because an individual who 
suspects that they are being filmed, and identified by strangers, may no longer feel free to 
move through public places speaking with whom they wish and attending the meetings 
that they wish.11 For instance, according to the Supreme Court, a woman has a protected 
liberty interest in seeking an abortion,12 but this right is infringed upon when someone 
 
9 Quentin Burrows, Scowl Because You’re On Candid Camera: Privacy and Video Surveillance, 31 Val. 
U. L. Rev. 1079, 1125 (1997). Humans have a fundamental belief in the right to personal autonomy 
which stems from dignity and individuality.  When the sphere of autonomy is consistently violated, the 
shell of humanity erodes.    
10 Kang, supra note 2; Kang & Cuff, supra note 2. 
11 The Supreme Court has expressly recognized that a right to freedom of association and belief is implicit 
in the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. This implicit right is limited to the right to associate for 
First Amendment purposes. It does not include a right of social association. The government may 
prohibit people from knowingly associating in groups that engage and promote illegal activities. The 
right to associate also prohibits the government from requiring a group to register or disclose its members 
or from denying government benefits on the basis of an individuals current or past membership in a 
particular group. There are exceptions to this rule where the Court finds that governmental interests in 
disclosure/registration outweigh interference with First Amendment rights. The government may also, 
generally, not compel individuals to express themselves, hold certain beliefs, or belong to particular 
associations or groups; see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education, 433 U.S. 915 (1977). 
12 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). In Casey, the Court found it appropriate to allow information to be reported about the women 
receiving abortions to state agencies, as long as the actual identity of the women remained confidential. 
Id. at 900. However, by being able to film all women entering a clinic, identity is discernable and 
capturable along with other potentially embarrassing personal information. Id. 
5invades the woman's privacy by filming her entering a clinic from a superhuman vantage 
point.13 The intrusion becomes even greater if the images are saved for some later 
use.14 Once a person knows that when they enter a public place their image may be 
recorded and analyzed, such knowledge may chill their desire to associate, especially 
with causes that are counter to stated government policies; such a result would be a 
severe blow to a democratic society. It seems intuitive that the law should recognize the 
difference between being seen in public by someone with their naked eyes, versus being 
filmed by unknown individuals using wearable computers and having their image 
uploaded to the internet and identified by strangers.15 Given the capabilities of video-
based wearable computer technology to film and track individuals, the law should 
provide for the protection of an individual’s privacy when personal information about 
that individual may be easily accessed on the internet and paired to the person’s image 
posted on the internet.  
As stated by several commentators, as society becomes more information-based, 
and as more information about an individual is available on the internet; and as the need 
for individuals to distribute their personal information increases;16 the need to protect 
such personal information intensifies.17 This article reviews the privacy protection people 
 
13 See Planned Parenthood v. Aakhus, 14 Cal.App.4th. 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that 
photographing and videotaping clients violated the right to privacy under the California Constitution); 
Chico Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Scully, 208 Cal.App.3d 230 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding an 
injunction against abortion protesters photographing license plates and people entering or leaving an 
abortion clinic). 
14 See generally Maureen O’Donnell, Cameras Around Every Corner, SUN-TIMES (Chi.), Feb. 18, 1996 
at 2. It has been reported that in Alaska residents using home computers can create a news letter with still 
photographs of potential criminals, see Court Allows States To Throw The Book, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/05/supremecourt/main542863.shtml (last visited Jan. 27, 
2006). 
15 See Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for 
Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 989, 1041 (1995).   
16 Kang, supra note 2; Kang & Cuff, supra note 2. 
17 Kang, supra note 2; Kearns, supra note 7; McClurg, supra note 15. 
6may expect to receive under current law when their image may be recorded, analyzed, 
and posted on the internet, and when they may be tracked in public places by individuals 
using wearable computer technology. The article concludes that the current law is 
insufficient to protect the privacy of individuals in the age of wirelessly networked 
wearable computers equipped with facial recognition software. As a result, the article 
calls for an expansion of the concept of an information privacy statute as expressed by 
Professor Kang,18 and for legislative action at the state or federal level to enact a 
comprehensive statute which would protect the information privacy rights of individuals 
in public places. 
EARLY THOUGHTS ON PRIVACY 
In the classic article by Warren and Brandeis on privacy written in 1890, the 
proposition that privacy was a basic right was introduced.19 After exploring the nature 
and scope of the right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis concluded that "it is the 
unwarranted invasion of individual privacy which is reprehended, and to be, so far as 
possible, prevented."20 Now days at the bank or at the mall,21 on the highway,22 at a 
grocery store,23 at a sports event,24 or even walking down a street,25 an individual’s 
 
18 Kang, supra note 2. 
19 Samuel Warren & Louis, D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890); but see Richard 
C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional 
Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 479, 482 n.5 (1990) (indicating that a 1881 
Michigan case and other sources discussed the right to privacy prior to the publication of the Warren & 
Brandeis article). 
20 Warren & Brandeis, id. at 215.  
21 Marcus Nieto, Public Video Surveillance: Is It An Effective Crime Prevention Tool? Available at 
http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/05/ (last visited Jan, 26, 2006). 
22 See generally Woodrow Barfield & Thomas Dingus (eds.) Human Factors in Intelligent Vehicle 
Highway Systems  (Lawrence Erlbaum Press, 1997).  
23 State v. Dunn, Slip Copy, Tenn.Crim.App., 2004 Tenn.Crim.App LEXIS 854 (2004) (defendant pled 
guilty to theft from a grocery store, the crime was recorded with a video camera which showed the 
defendant loading shopping carts full of groceries and leaving the store without paying); see State v. 
James, Minn.App. LEXIS 1155 (Minn.App. 2004) (evidence of the robbery of a convenience store was 
based on sister’s identification from surveillance video).  
7privacy can be severely compromised as they are unknowingly filmed by a host of video 
cameras, some containing facial recognition software.26 
Since the Warren and Brandeis article was first written, the technology which can 
be used to capture a person’s image, track their movements, and therefore intrude upon 
their privacy has improved dramatically. One significant difference regarding video 
technology today compared to just a few years ago, is that once an individual’s image is 
recorded, it can be subjected to analysis by facial recognition software and compared to 
millions of images stored in government and private databases.27 That is, facial 
recognition technology28 coupled with video cameras can be used to take pictures of 
individuals in a crowd which can then be compared to the facial features of known 
individuals, using standard biometric measurements. With video-based wearable 
computers, no longer will an individual be able to move within a public place with some 
degree of anonymity, instead once they are filmed, they can be subjected to analysis by 
facial recognition software and identified, thus losing any anonymity they may have had. 
In addition, once an individual’s image is captured using video cameras, the image can be 
manipulated in various ways; for example, it is relatively easy to insert a digital image 
into film, video, or a picture in such as way as to create a false or misleading impression 
 
24 Jack Carey, USA TODAY, ACLU Protests High-tech Super Bowl Surveillance, 02/06/2002, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2001-02-02-super-bowl-surveillance.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 
2006). 
25 Steve Mann, Sousveillance and Cyborglobs: A 30 year Empirical Voyage Through Ethical, Legal, and 
Policy Issues, 14 Presence: Telerobotics and Virtual Environments 625 (2005). 
26 A person may be filmed at a border entry by a government agency, or by a non-governmental actor such 
as the owner of a store at a mall, or by an employer at a workplace. But the fact that a person may be 
“surveilled” by a non-government source may not mean that the individual’s image is not accessible by 
the government, as the state can buy or subpoena private data, Kang & Cuff, supra note 2, at 127; see 
also http://www.law.ucla.edu/kang/gigs/iLaw%202004%20privacy/politics.html#Topic69 (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2005). 
27 In the government context, the IRS may be interested in viewing the video of a tax delinquent making a 
large consumer purchase.    
28 See generally Ric Simmons, The Powers and Pitfalls of Technology: Technology-Enhanced Surveillance 
by Law Enforcement Officials, 60 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 711 (2005). 
8that a particular person was at a particular place at a particular time.29 This illustrates the 
point that video images can be used for purposes far beyond the individual’s original 
consent, if consent were given at all.  
Based on the pervasiveness of video equipment, the relevant question to ask is 
not: Am I being filmed?30 Instead, the relevant question to ask is: Who is doing the 
filming, and what is being done with my image? These questions are timely given the 
increased technological capabilities to film individuals in public places, analyze their 
faces using software, transmit that person’s image using the internet to anywhere in the 
world, and track their movements. Video technology with facial recognition software, 
combined with the ability to search the internet for personal information about an 
individual, along with the ability to track an individuals movements in public places, all 
combine to threaten an individuals privacy in ways well beyond that discussed by Warren 
and Brandeis31 when they called for new law to account for privacy violations resulting 
from recent technology advances. 
II. WEARABLE COMPUTERS 
The type of wearable computer that is the focus of this article consists of a small 
portable computer worn on the body which contains a miniature camera for video 
 
29 Seanna Browder, Now, The Cops are Strapping on Computers, Bus. Wk., July 13, 1998, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/1998/28/b3586110.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2006) (reporting field-testing 
in three cities of lightweight wearable computers for use in police investigation; computers are equipped 
with digital cameras and laser range finders for recording crime-scene data).  
30 In the context of privacy rights in the information age, it is interesting to note the sentiment expressed by 
Scott McNealy, CEO of Sun Microsystems, in a question posed to him about online privacy he answered: 
"You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it," available at 
http://www.techcentralstation.com/051500C.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 
31 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19. 
9capture, a head-worn display,32 input device, and a wireless internet connection. The 
main benefit of a wearable computer is that it allows an individual to access information 
at any time and any place.33 Wearable computers are especially useful for applications 
that require computational support while the user's hands, voice, eyes or attention are 
actively engaged with the physical environment. Depending on the application, the 
primary input to a wearable computer might be a chording keyboard, gesture, or speech 
recognition. There are different kinds of technology that may be considered a wearable 
computer, for example, a watch containing a calculator is a wearable computer as is a 
portable GPS unit. However, only some forms of wearable computers pose a threat to an 
individual’s privacy- essentially those that contain a video camera or those that track a 
person’s location.   
The internet combined with advances in wearable-computer technologies, makes 
the comments of Warren and Brandeis on the unwarranted invasion of an individual’s 
privacy even more applicable to current times.34 With wearable computing technology,35 
a person walking down the street can unknowingly have their image captured by a 
miniature video camera worn by another person, and through a wireless network, have 
their facial image appear on the stranger’s web page accessible to millions, all without 
 
32 Wearable computers are often integrated into the user's clothing or can be attached to the body through 
some other means, like a wristband. They may also be integrated into everyday objects that are 
constantly worn on the body, like a hands-free cell phone. 
33 See generally Steve Mann & Woodrow Barfield, Introduction to Mediated Reality, 15 International 
Journal of Human-Computer Interaction 2 (2003) (discussing the promise of wearable computers and 
mediated reality).
34 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19. 
35 Steve Mann, Wearable, Tetherless Computer—Mediated Reality: WearCam as a Wearable Face-
Recognizer, and Other Applications for the Disabled, available at http://wearcam.org/vmp.htm (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2006). Edward O. Thorp, The Invention of the First Wearable Computer, available at 
(http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?isnumber=15725&amp;arnumber=729523&amp;count=3
0&amp;index=1) (last visited Jan. 26, 2006), also in The Second International Symposium on Wearable 
Computers: Digest of Papers, IEEE Computer Society, 4-8 (1998). 
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their knowledge or express consent.36 A video-based wearable computer that is wirelessly 
networked poses new and compelling privacy concerns for individuals in public places 
and raises a host of legal questions; for example, does an individual have a right to 
consent to their image being filmed and subjected to analysis by facial recognition 
software; and does a person have a right to stop an individual from posting their image on 
the internet?  
Due to the invasiveness of facial recognition software coupled with the video 
capability of wearable computers, some technologists have argued for the creation of 
privacy faces, which could be emitted electronically by any individual with the 
appropriate technology.37 The use of a privacy face would allow only certain types of 
data for a particular individual to be accessible by another’s computing system.38 The use 
of such technology represents a technological solution to the problem of having an image 
recorded and uploaded to the internet without consent, but such a solution is inapplicable 
to the vast majority of people who enter public places without the aid of technological 
devices to protect their privacy.    
VIDEO SURVEILLANCE AND DATABASES 
One threat to an individual’s privacy is the fact that the use of facial recognition 
software, in combination with wider use of video surveillance, may grow increasingly 
 
36 See generally Woodrow Barfield, Steve Mann, Kevin Baird, Francine Gemperle, Chris Kasabach, John 
Stivoric, Malcolm Bauer & Richard Martin, Computational Clothing and Accessories, in Fundamentals 
of Wearable Computers and Augmented Reality, Woodrow Barfield & Thomas Caudell (eds.) (Elsevier 
Press 2001). See also J. Spence (dissent) in Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal.2d 224, 227 (1953) 
(arguing that placing oneself in the public view does not mean consenting to your image being observed 
by millions.) 
37 Kang, supra note 2; Kang & Cuff, supra note 2, at 136-137; see, e.g., Scott Lederer, Anind K. Dey & 
Jenifer Mankiff, Everyday Practices in Ubiquitous Computing Environments, available at 
http://guir.berkeley.edu/pubs/ubicomp2002/privacyworkshop/papers/lederer-ubicomp 
02-workshop.pdf  (discussing the use of privacy faces) (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).   
38 Kang & Cuff, id. at 136.  
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invasive over time. In theory, a positive benefit of wearable computer systems combined 
with video is to allow law enforcement to scan through thousands of faces in a crowd and 
then alert officers to the presence of any known fugitives that might be present. However, 
once installed, a video surveillance system rarely remains confined to its original 
purpose, and instead often expands in ways that threatens privacy. As new ways of using 
video surveillance and facial recognition systems suggest themselves, the authorities or 
operators of such systems may find them to be an irresistible expansion of their power, 
and if so, citizens' privacy may suffer. The end result of abuses of power is the threat that 
widespread use of video cameras may change the character, feel, and quality of American 
life itself.39 Abuses of power associated with the use of video systems and databases may 
not be confined solely to “powers of authority,” private citizens in possession of such 
technology may also use the technology to invade an individual’s privacy and access 
personal information about that person. A later section of this article will discuss such 
abuses in the context of video voyeurism and reality filming.40 
One problem with online databases is that they can be accessed by hackers and 
thieves, with resulting breaches in privacy to individuals and database owners. For 
example, the Federal Trade Commission recently required that data warehouser 
ChoicePoint Inc. pay a fine to settle charges that its security and record-handling 
procedures violated consumers' privacy rights and federal laws.41 ChoicePoint collects 
data on individuals, including Social Security numbers, real estate holdings and current 
 
39 What's Wrong With Public Video Surveillance? Available at 
http://aolsvc.weather.aol.com/main.adp?location=USNC0120 (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 
40 Infra sections VI and VII. 
41 FTC Hits ChoicePoint With a $15 Million Fine, available at 
http://articles.news.aol.com/news/article.adp?id=20060126095809990009&_mpc=news%2e10%2e4&cid
=403 (last visited Jan. 26, 2005). 
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and former addresses. It has about 19 billion records, and its customers include insurance 
companies, financial institutions and federal, state and local agencies.42 Choicepoint 
revealed that its massive database of consumer information was accessed by thieves 
posing as small business customers. The Federal Trade Commission said it fined the 
company ten million dollars, the biggest fine the agency had ever imposed, and that 
Choicepoint would be required to pay an additional five million dollars to compensate 
consumers.43 The Federal Trade Commission indicated that "The message to ChoicePoint 
and others should be clear: Consumers' private data must be protected from thieves."44 
The settlement requires ChoicePoint to implement new procedures to ensure that it 
provides consumer reports only to legitimate businesses for lawful purposes, to establish 
and maintain a comprehensive information security program and to obtain audits by an 
independent third-party security professional every other year until 2026.45 This example 
illustrates the difficulty of keeping an online database secure, and that information that is 
highly private and sensitive may be accessed by hackers and thieves, and may ultimately 
end up for sale to the highest bidder.  
Another concern associated with video-based wearable computers and databases 
relates to an aspect of human nature. As video camera systems are operated by persons, 
they bring to the technology all their existing prejudices and biases. In Great Britain, for 
example, camera operators have been found to focus disproportionately on people of 
color, and the mostly male operators frequently focus voyeuristically on women.46 Even 
 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id.
45 Id. 
46 Electronic Privacy Information Center, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/surveillance/ (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2006). 
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though video surveillance by the police isn't as widespread in the U.S., as Great Britain, 
an investigation by the Detroit Free Press still shows the kind of abuses that can happen.47 
Looking at how a database available to Michigan law enforcement was used, the 
newspaper found that officers had used it to help their friends or themselves stalk women, 
threaten motorists, track estranged spouses - even to intimidate political opponents.48 
According to one commentator, the unavoidable conclusion is that the more people who 
have access to a database, the more likely that there will be abuse.49 Facial recognition 
technology is especially subject to abuse because it can be used in a passive way that 
doesn't require the knowledge, consent, or participation of the subject50 and once an 
image is an a database, it can be used in a way that far exceeds the original purpose of 
creating the database. According to one commentator, the creation of a database multiples 
the effects of sensors.51 For example, video cameras have a far less intrusive effect on 
privacy if their only use is to be monitored in real time by a person.  However, the longer 
the tapes are archived the greater their potential effect, and the more the tapes can be 
indexed according to who and what they show rather than just where and when they were 
made.52 Further, the greater the amount of information about an individual that is placed 
in a database, the greater the danger that personal information and facts about the person 
may appear with the person’s image on the internet resulting in a level of intrusion into 
 
47 M. L. Elrick, Cops Tap Database to Harass, Intimidate, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Misuse Among Police 
Frequent, Say Some, but Punishments Rare, July 31, 2001, available at 
http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2006).  
48 Id. 
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy? 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1461 (2000). 
52 Id.
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the private affairs of an individual, unknown before recent times.53 
SOUSVEILLENCE 
In response to the use of video cameras by authority figures to place individuals 
under surveillance or to film a person as they move around public spaces, is the idea that 
individuals may protect their privacy by “filming the filmers.”54 The term 
“sousveillance”55 refers both to the concept of inverse surveillance (filming the filmers), 
as well as to the recording of an activity from the perspective of a participant in the 
activity.56 An example of the latter idea is the use of phone cameras for what some have 
termed “citizen journalism.”57 On this point, consider George Holiday’s videotape of Los 
Angeles police officers beating of Rodney King.58 Another illustration of the recording of 
an activity from the individual’s perspective comes from recent news headlines. After the 
terrorists bombing of the London subway which occurred July 21, 2005 some of the first 
video from the scene was from subway riders who filmed the scene with their phone 
cameras.  
 
53 The Total Information Awareness (TIA) program was a government program designed to mine data in 
commercial as well as government databases to spot patterns that could indicate terrorist activity.  
Hiawatha Bray, Mining Data to Fight Terror Stirs  Privacy Fears, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 3, 2003, at 
C2, available at 2003 WL 3388980. Although Congress eliminated funding for TIA, similar efforts 
continue, see Duane D. Stanford, ACLU Attacks Matrix on Privacy, available at 
http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/metro/1003/31matrix.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006) (describing an 
initiative by several state governments to develop a program similar to TIA, the Multistate Anti-
Terrorism Information Exchange (Matrix)), available at 2003 WL 66525863. 
54 See generally Mann, supra note 25; Howard Kleinberg, Video Cameras Turn the Tables on Big Brother,
L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 22, 1991, at 6 (claiming that we are a society that has become accustomed to 
instant replay). 
55 Mann, id, sousveillance is derived from inverse surveillance, taken from the French "sous" for "below", 
plus "veiller" for "to watch."  
56 Id. 
57 Paul J. Gough & Chris Marlowe, Cell Phone Video First from London Bombing Scene, WEB/NEW 
MEDIA: News, July 8, 2005, available at 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr/new_media/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000975698 (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2006). 
58 Katherine Fulton, The Anxious Journey of a Technophobe, Columbia Journalism Review, available at 
http://archives.cjr.org/year/93/6/technophobe.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2006); see also Rodney King and 
the Los Angeles Riots, available at http://www.citivu.com/ktla/sc-ch1b.html (last visited Jan 26, 2006). 
15
From the community that advocates “shooting back,” as a response to video 
surveillance, has come the term “inverse surveillance” which is used to refer to the 
recording or monitoring of a real or apparent authority figure by others, particularly those 
who are generally the subject of surveillance.59 Inverse surveillance is therefore 
considered a type of sousveillance.60 According to Professor Mann, an example of 
inverse surveillance in the auditory domain occurs when one or more parties to a 
conversation record it, which represents an act of sousveillance; whereas when the 
conversation is recorded by a person who is not a party to the conversation, such a 
recording may be termed "surveillance."61 Audio sousveillance is allowed in most 
states,62 and by Federal law63 but audio surveillance is illegal in most states.64 
Some commentators argue that sousveillance, to some extent, reduces or 
eliminates the need for surveillance.65 They argue that in this sense it is possible to 
replace the Panoptic God's eye view of surveillance with a more community-building 
ubiquitous personal experience capture.66 In their view, crimes, for example, might be 
solved by way of collaboration among the citizenry equipped with video cameras rather 
than through the watching over the citizenry from above.67 However, even with the 
 
59 Steve Mann, who coined the term souesveillance, describes it as "watchful vigilance from underneath." 
In contrast, surveillance denotes the "eye-in-the-sky" watching from above; whereas sousveillance 
denotes bringing the camera or other means of observation down to the human level, see Mann, supra 
note 25. 
60 “Hierarchical sousveillance" refers, for example, to citizens photographing police, shoppers 
photographing shopkeepers, or taxicab passengers photographing cab drivers, see generally Mann, supra 
note 25 
61 Id. at 635. 
62 Id. at 635-636. See infra, note 262. 
63 See generally Advanced Electronics Group, Inc., available at  http://www.aegi.com/faqs.html (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2005). 
64 Id. Mann, supra note 25; see generally Antonietta Vitale, Video Voyuerism and the Right to Privacy: The 
Time For Federal Legislation is Now, 27 Seton Hall Legis. J. 381, 390-392 (2003).
65 Mann, supra note 25. 
66 Id. at 634-637. 
67 Id. at 634-637. 
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proposed benefits of filming those that place individual citizens under surveillance, 
comes the risk of invading the privacy of other individuals not expecting to be filmed, 
this raises the fundamental questions of whether those engaged in sousveillance are 
simply replacing one filmer with another and whether by advocating the wearing of video 
cameras for the citizenry, we are building a society where every action by every 
individual is filmed- creating a society with zero privacy.    
III. FACIAL RECOGNITION BIOMETRICS  
As the focus of this article is on privacy in public places as a function of facial 
recognition software integrated into wearable computers, this section presents an 
overview of facial recognition technology. Facial recognition systems are computer 
programs that analyze images of human faces for the purpose of identifying them.68 
Generally, the facial scans captured by video are converted into numerical codes that are 
then stored and searched in databases.69 Facial recognition programs work by recording a 
facial image, measuring facial characteristics, or landmarks, such as the distance between 
the eyes, the length of the nose, and the angle of the jaw, and then creating a file called 
either a "template" or “faceprint”70 Some facial software systems define these landmarks 
as nodal points,71 and there are about 80 nodal points on a human face.72 These nodal 
 
68 A. Linney & A. M. Coombes, Computer Modelling of Facial Form, in Craniofacial Identification in 
Forensic Medicine, J. G. Clement & D. L. Ranson  (eds.) (Arnold, London, 1998). 
69 I. Bajnoczky & L. Kiralyfalvi, A New Approach to Computer-Aided Comparison of Skull and 
Photograph, 108 International Journal of Legal Medicine 157-161 (1995); T. Catterick, Facial 
Measurements as an Aid to Recognition, 56 Forensic Science International 23-27 (1992); M. Y. Iscan  
Introduction to Techniques for Photographic Comparison: Potential and Problems, in Forensic Analysis 
of the Skull,  M. Y. Iscan & R. P. Helmer (eds.) (Wiley, New York, 1993). 
70 W. R. Maples & D. E. Austin, Photo/Video Superimposition in Individual Identification of the Living,
Presented at the 44th Annual Meeting of American Academy of Forensic Sciences, New Orleans, 
Louisiana, February 17–22 (1992); see also M. Proesmans & L. Van Gool, Getting  Facial Features and 
Gestures in 3D, in Face Recognition, H. Wechsler, P. Jonathin Phillips, Vicki Bruce, Francoise 
Fogelman Soulie & Thomas S. Huang, eds., 288–309 (Springer, Berlin, 1998). 
71 Emelie Rutherford, Facial-Recognition Tech has People Pegged, available at 
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/TECH/ptech/07/17/face.time.idg/  (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 
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points are measured by facial recognition systems to create a numerical code, a string of 
numbers that represents the face in a database.73 Using templates, the software then 
compares a recorded image with a stored image and produces a score that measures how 
similar the images are to each other. Typical sources of images for use in facial 
recognition systems include video camera images and pre-existing photos such as those 
in driver's license databases.  
The FaceIt facial recognition system which is a commercially available software 
package used to capture and compare facial images, will be used as an exemplar to 
describe how facial recognition systems operate in the field.74 When FaceIt is attached to 
a video system, it searches the camera’s field of view for faces. An algorithm is used to 
search for faces in low resolution.75 If there is a face in the view, it is detected within a 
fraction of a second. The system switches to a high-resolution search only after a head-
like shape is detected. A process termed “alignment” occurs once a face is detected and 
the system determines the head's position, size and pose. A face needs to be turned at 
some angle toward the camera, at least within 35 degrees for the version of FaceIt 
discussed here, in order for the facial recognition system to register it. The process of 
normalization occurs when the image of the head is scaled and rotated so that it can be 
registered and mapped into an appropriate size and pose.76 
72 Id.
73 Id. 
74 FaceIt® is a scalable off-the-shelf facial recognition system that detects and identifies humans as they 
pass through a camera’s field of view, available at 
http://www.identix.com/products/pro_security_bnp_argus.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). 
75 An algorithm is a program that provides a set of instructions to accomplish a specific task. 
76 Normalization is performed on the image regardless of the head's location and distance from the camera. 
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The heart of the FaceIt facial recognition system is the “local feature analysis 
algorithm.”77 The algorithm represents the mathematical technique used by the system to 
encode faces. The system maps the face and creates a faceprint, a unique numerical code 
for that face. Once the system has stored a faceprint, it can compare it to the thousands or 
millions of images stored in a database. According to one source, a facial recognition 
system can match multiple images at a rate of 60 million per minute from memory or 15 
million per minute from hard disk.78 As comparisons are made, the system assigns a 
value to the comparison using a scale of one to 10; if a score is above a predetermined 
threshold, a match is declared.  
 There are ongoing attempts to improve the accuracy of facial recognition 
techniques.79 A recent advance in facial recognition systems is the use of the texture of 
the skin to assist in identifying an individual.80 For example, using an algorithm called 
surface texture analysis, the surface of the skin can be analyzed for random features 
which results in a “skinprint,” or skin template.81 The skinprint can be used on its own to 
recognize faces, or can be fused together with traditional facial or fingerprint biometric 
techniques to increase the level of accuracy with current facial recognition systems.82 
77 FaceIt, supra note 74. 
78 Disneys Technology, available at http://www.lecs.cs.ucla.edu/site-
specifics/index.php/Disneys_Technology (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 
79 Id. 
80 Facial Biometrics, FaceIt’s webpage, available at http://www.identix.com/trends/face.html (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2006). See also Face-Off (discussing the accuracy of various facial recognition systems), 
available at http://www.fcw.com/print.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). 
81 Id.
82 Id.
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LIMITATIONS OF FACIAL RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 
It has been reported by some commentators that there are severe limitations 
associated with facial recognition systems which itself brings up a host of legal issues.83 
For example, inaccuracies in facial recognition systems may result in misidentification of 
individuals or inaccurate or misleading information paired to a person’s picture posted on 
the internet. One difficulty for facial recognition systems in that faces are highly complex 
patterns that often differ in only subtle ways, and it is very difficult for a machine-based 
system to match images when there are differences in lighting, camera, or camera angle 
between recorded and stored images.84 There are also changes in the appearance of the 
face itself that make identification of individuals difficult, that is, unlike our fingerprints 
or irises, our faces do not stay the same over time. And facial recognition systems are 
easily influenced by changes in hairstyle, facial hair, or body weight, by simple disguises, 
and by the effects of aging.85 
A study by the government's National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) found false-negative rates for face-recognition verification of 43 percent using 
photos of subjects taken just 18 months earlier.86 The NIST study also found that a 
change of 45 degrees in the camera angle rendered the software useless.87 Studies by 
 
83 Warned Julian Ashbourn, who wrote a book on biometrics called “Biometrics: Advanced Identity 
Verification: The Complete Guide” (Springer 2000), “There are a number of variables to the real-life 
application of facial technology, it will never be 100 percent accurate.”  Id. Because of these limitations, 
many companies using facial recognition software rely on a back-up or secondary system to verify 
results. Id.
84 Id. 
85 Id.
86 Commerce's NIST Reports Significant Advances Made in Facial Recognition Technology, available at 
http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/n03-04.htm (last visited Feb 1, 2006); see also 2002 Army 
Research Lab Study of Facial Recognition, link available at 
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/15198res20030902.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2006); Facial 
Recognition Systems: New Accuracy Study, available at http://talkleft.com/new_archives/002184.html 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2006).    
87 Id.
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NIST have shown that there are significant differences in facial matching abilities of 
facial recognition systems, depending on whether the images were taken indoors or 
outdoors.88 It has been reported that facial recognition performance for outdoor images is 
only about half as good as for indoor images, where there is better control of lighting 
conditions.89 
Generally, facial recognition technology works best under tightly controlled 
conditions, e.g., when the subject is staring directly into the camera under bright lights. 
Grainy, dated video surveillance photographs of the type likely to be on file for many 
individuals would be a poor template as a matching image. In addition, questions have 
been raised about how well the software works on dark-skinned individuals, whose 
features may not appear clearly on lenses optimized for light-skinned people. And finally, 
differences in facial expressions, such as when an individual yawns, may affect the 
accuracy of facial recognition systems.   
IV. FACIAL RECOGNITION VIDEO SYSTEMS IN USE 
 The need to know the specific identity of an individual is a recent development in 
video surveillance and wearable computers and has led to the implementation of facial 
recognition software in systems with video capabilities. There are many current uses of 
facial recognition technologies coupled with wearable computers. For example, security 
personnel in major U.S. airports may use wearable computers equipped with facial 
recognition software so they can identify suspicious travelers.90 The goal of a wearable 
 
88 See Philip Bulman, Commerce's NIST Reports Significant Advances Made in Facial Recognition 
Technology, available at http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/n03-04.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 
2006). 
89 Id. 
90 Ramon G. McLeod, PCWorld.com, Airport Security Adopts Wearable Computers, available at 
http://pcworld.about.com/news/Nov132001id70826.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2006). 
21
computer security system is to get local verification' of an individuals identity so that the 
appropriate people at the terminal can get the information they need rapidly. Another 
application of wearable computers equipped with facial recognition software is the “iCare 
Interaction Assistant,” a device for helping individuals who are visually impaired.91 With 
this system, facial recognition technology is used as a social interaction assistant to help 
identify and interpret facial expressions, emotions and gestures and then communicate 
that information to visually impaired individuals.92 
After the terrorist’s attacks of 9-11,93 the U.S. government has been actively 
investigating the use of biometric technologies94 including facial recognition software 
that can potentially pick a suspected terrorist out of a crowded room.95 Through this 
research agenda, the Department of Defense has been providing research funds to 
universities, with the goal of identifying people in a variety of lighting and background 
situations.96 The goal of one such research project, HumanID,97 is to develop automated 
 
91 Sreekar Krishna, Greg Little, John Black & Sethuraman Panchanathan, Assistive Technologies for 
Individuals with Visual Impairments, Proceedings of the 7th International ACM SIGACCESS 
Conference on Computers and Accessibility 106-113 (2005).  
92 Id. 
93 James Loy, U.S. Urges OSCE States to Adopt Biometric, Cargo Standards at OSCE Vienna Conference. 
“The United States shares lengthy and friendly borders with two countries… across which more than 500 
million people, 130 million motor vehicles, and 2.5 million rail cars pass every year.  But we also patrol 
nearly 95,000 miles of shoreline and waters, and more than 360 ports that see 8,000 foreign flag vessels, 
9 million containers of cargo, and nearly 200 million passengers every year as well. Not to mention more 
than 500 airports that handle more than 30,000 flights and 1.8 million passengers every single day.   In 
short, our borders are active places- where the engines of world commerce churn and the cameras of 
world tourists click,” Id., available at http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2004/Jun/24-993135.html (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2006). 
94 Biometrics refers to advanced identity verification techniques that use personal characteristics such as 
fingerprints, facial patterns, and so forth to identify individuals. These features of the technology cause 
some to raise the cry of Big Brother.  
95 Lucas Mast, Biometrice: Hold On, Chicken Little, Issue #31, available at 
http://www.cato.org/tech/tk/020118-tk.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 
96 See e.g., I. Pavlidis & P. Symosek, The Imaging Issue in an Automatic Face/Disguise Detection System,
Proceedings 2000 IEEE Workshop on Computer Vision Beyond the Visible Spectrum: Methods and 
Applications, 15-24, Hilton Head Island, South Carolina (2000). 
97 One aspect of the research project is to investigate Thermal Facial Screening which is a non-invasive 
facial screening device that can detect psychological state (e.g. anxiety, alertness, and fear). Thermal 
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biometric identification technologies to detect, recognize and identify humans at great 
distances.98 The federally funded research is also aimed at developing the capability to 
identify individuals based on their gait.99 
Unlike other biometric systems, facial recognition can be used for general 
surveillance, usually in combination with public video cameras. There have been several 
such uses of facial recognition software in the United States thus far. One example is in 
airports, where video systems with facial recognition capabilities have been adopted in 
the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9-11.100 And in some U.S. cities, such as Virginia 
Beach, Virginia, facial recognition technology has been implemented on public streets to 
search for criminals.101 In addition, in England, where public, police-operated video 
cameras are widespread, individual towns such as Newham and London have 
experimented extensively with the technology.102 
Most people are not aware of the pervasiveness and technological capabilities of 
video systems coupled with facial recognition software.103 A recent field test of video-
 
facial detection and recognition operates in the near infrared band, the objective of which is a system that 
will detect faces of pedestrians and vehicle occupants under challenging illumination and weather 
conditions. See also Gait Detection Research at the Georgia Institute of Technology where researchers 
are developing technologies to recognize a person's walk, or gait, available at 
http://gtresearchnews.gatech.edu/newsrelease/GAIT.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). 
98 Human ID at a Distance (HumanID), Program Manager: Jonathan Phillips, available at 
http://www.21cmagazine.com/issue2/iao_remix/humanid.html (last visited Jan.. 29, 2005). 
99 Id.
100 Charlie Goodyear, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (December 17, 2001). Some argue facial 
recognition at Fresno's airport is too nosy. Since it began operating the system has falsely identified 
several passengers as potential suspects, according to airport officials, while registering no true matches. 
Id. Those passengers mistakenly identified were pulled out of line and questioned briefly before being 
allowed to pass, said Fresno airport spokeswoman Patty Miller. Id. available at 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2001/12/17/MN164532.DTL (last visited Jan, 26, 2006). 
101 See Face Recognition, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/facerecognotion/ (last visited Feb. 1, 
2006). 
102 A History of Video Surveillance in England, available at http://www.notbored.org/england-history.html 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 
103 Laurent Belsie, The Eyes Have it For Now, Britain has an estimated 1.5 million surveillance cameras 
(some reports suggest 2.5 million or more), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1107/p15s02-
lihc.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). No one knows how many surveillance cameras sweep public space 
23
based surveillance highlights some of the capabilities and uses of video systems as 
applied to the general public.  In January 2001, roughly 100,000 ticket-holders viewed 
the Super Bowl in Tampa, Florida. Secretly the police took pictures of every attendee as 
they entered the stadium through the turnstiles and compared the recorded photographic 
images against a database of some undisclosed kind; the recorded images were then 
compared to the database using facial recognition software.104 The authorities would not 
say who was in that database, but the facial recognition software was reported to flag 19 
individuals.105 The police indicated that some of those were false alarms, and no one 
flagged by the system was anything more than a petty criminal such as a ticket scalper.106 
Facial recognition systems are also being tested and used at public schools.107 For 
example, in Phoenix, Arizona, facial recognition technology designed to recognize 
registered sex offenders and missing children has been installed at a school in a pilot 
project.108 The video system installed at the school is linked to state and national 
databases of sex offenders, missing children and alleged abductors.109 Using a wide-area 
network, video images captured at the school are transferred to the local Sheriff's office, 
 
in the United States, but the number is rising. In Times Square, perhaps the nation's most monitored 
public area, the number of surveillance cameras more than tripled in a four year period. Id. 
104 Barbara Dority, A Brave New World--Or a Technological Nightmare? Big Brother is Watching!
Humanist (2001). 
105 Id. 
106 Id.
107 School Face Scanner to Search for Sex Offenders: Civil Rights Groups Raise Concerns (2003), 
available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/EDUCATION/12/12/facial.recognition.ap/ (last visited Jan. 28, 
2006). 
108 Id.
109 Justin Brown, Maricopa County Tests Facial Recognition Technology in Schools, Royal Palm Middle 
School is the first school nationwide to install cameras to detect faces of suspected child abductors, sex 
offenders or missing children, and instantly alert police. Id. If the pilot is successful, the Maricopa 
County Sheriff's Office hopes to expand the program to all 800 schools in the county. Id. (2004). See e.g., 
http://www.centerdigitaled.com/converge/?pg=magstory&id=90422 (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). 
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where facial recognition software110 is used to scan 28 facial features of the recorded 
images in an effort to match them against images in databases containing missing 
children, suspected child abductors and sexual predators. Supposedly, images not 
matching the databases are immediately erased;111 however, the ability to recover images 
erased from a computer hard drive, is a well-known technology and thus the storage of 
facial images in any database as the public exercises their right to move freely within 
public spaces is troublesome.  
One of the most innovative uses of facial recognition is being employed by the 
Mexican government, which is using the technology to weed out duplicate voter 
registrations.112 To sway an election, people will register several times under different 
names so they can vote more than once. Using facial recognition technology, officials can 
search through facial images in the voter database for duplicates at the time of 
registration.113 New images are compared to the records already on file to catch those 
who attempt to register under aliases. The technology was used in the country's 2000 
presidential election and is expected to be used in local elections as well.114 Other current 
uses for facial recognition software is by casinos; law enforcement to digitalize mug 
shots; welfare departments to look for double-dippers; drivers' license bureaus to reduce 
 
110 One example is the Hummingbird facial recognition software, see e.g., 
http://www.govtech.net/magazine/story.php?id=89806&issue=4:2004 (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). 
111 Brown, supra note 109. Civil libertarians have raised red flags about the idea, pointing to potential 
privacy violations, and biometrics experts say facial recognition programs are not foolproof.  
112 Cédric Laurant, Privacy and Human Rights 2004, An International Survey of Privacy Laws and 
Developments, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Washington, DC – USA. Mexican Government 
Adopts FaceIt® Face Recognition Technology to Eliminate Duplicate Voter Registrations in Upcoming 
Presidential Election, available at 
http://www.shareholder.com/identix/ReleaseDetail.cfm?ReleaseID=53264 (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 
113 Id.
114 Id.
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I.D. forgers; and ATMs to separate clients from thieves.115 Finally, a biometric security 
plan being tested by NASA, would also allow engineers to control unmanned spacecraft 
from their home computer, using both facial scanning and fingerprint readers.116 
V. PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF WEARABLE COMPUTERS 
As noted, wearable computers equipped with video-based facial recognition 
technology can be used to record and analyze a person’s face, track their movements, and 
upload their image to the internet where personal information about the individual can be 
paired to the recorded image; does such a use of the technology result in an invasion of 
privacy under the current law?117 To answer this question, the article first discusses the 
general concept of privacy, reviews Fourth Amendment law on search and seizure, and 
presents case law relating to the filming of individuals in a public place.  
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis were the first legal scholars to introduce a 
comprehensive notion of a common-law right of privacy into American jurisprudence.118 
However, although they were the first legal scholars to document a right of privacy, 
privacy-related notions such as trespass, protecting property from invasion, and 
individual protections in criminal law already existed as integral parts of early American 
 
115 San Francisco's InnoVentry (which is going out of business), was using face-scanning software in its 
check-cashing machines to separate customers from crooks. The machines were designed to cater to 
check cashers who didn't have enough money to open a bank account.  A camera incorporated into 
InnoVentry's machines was used to scan customers' faces when they tried to cash a check for the first 
time. The image was then compared with a "negative file" of people who had tried to pass bad checks. If 
no matches were made, the customer completed the transaction. On the next visit, all the customer had to 
do to get the cash was type in the correct social security number and get his or her face scanned. Id.
Available at http://www.atmmarketplace.com/news_story_10825.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2006). 
116 Julina Scheeres, Smile, You're On Scan Camera; and Declan McCullagh, Call it Face Scan I, both 
available at http://www.mckinnonsc.vic.edu.au/la/it/ipmnotes/biometrics/facescan.htm (last visited Jan. 
28, 2006). 
117 Consider that in Anchorage Alaska, at one time video images from surveillance cameras were not 
transferred to the police department, but instead were sent to resident’s home computers. 20/20: The 
Eyes of the Law (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 8, 1995, transcript 1536) at 6.  
118 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19 at 193. 
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law.119 Warren and Brandeis defined privacy as a right to "be let alone"120 and centered 
their concern upon technological devices that existed in the 1890’s, especially 
"instantaneous" photographs.121 In calling for new law to remedy invasions into people’s 
privacy, Warren and Brandeis argued that "political, social, and economic" changes in 
society required recognition of new rights and that the common law should adapt to 
accommodate those societal needs.122 Now days, the development of wirelessly 
networked wearable computers equipped with miniature cameras, may pose an equal if 
not greater challenge to an individual’s right to privacy as did the use of still photographs 
in the 1890’s. While in either case, an individual may be exposing their image to the 
scrutiny of the general public when they enter a public place- the scope of the exposure, 
the extended length of time an individual’s image may be recorded, the almost 
instantaneous nature of posting the recorded image on the internet, the ability of software 
to analyze the individual’s image, and the ability of software to search databases and 
provide personal information about an individual- all represent a significant advance in 
the ability of technology to invade a persons “right to be left alone” once they enter a 
public place. 
Interestingly, the United States Constitution contains no direct reference to a right 
of privacy; but the High Court has held that such a fundamental right does exist. In 
Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court stated that privacy was a 
fundamental right established through the "zone of privacy" found within the Bill of 
 
119 See generally Turkington, supra note 19. 
120 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 193.  
121 Id. at 195. 
122 Id. at 193. 
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Rights.123 Despite this concept of privacy, an individual’s right under the Constitution to 
protect themselves from interested observers remains limited. In fact, early courts 
initially declined to recognize the “right to be left alone” as expressed by Warren and 
Brandeis.124 For example, in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., the New York 
Court of Appeals dismissed a suit for invasion of privacy by a woman whose picture was 
placed on 25,000 poster’s advertising defendant’s flour without her consent.125 The court 
failed to provide relief and declared that no right to privacy existed.126 In response to the 
public outcry after Roberson, the New York legislature enacted section 51 of the Civil 
Rights Law providing a cause of action for anyone whose name, portrait or picture was 
used for advertising or for purposes of trade without written consent.127 A few years after 
the Roberson case was decided, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Pavesich v. New 
England Life Insurance Company, recognized a common law right to privacy where the 
defendant published the plaintiff’s name and picture to advertise its insurance services 
without the plaintiff’s consent.128 In the 1930s, most jurisdictions accepted a common-
 
123 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-486 (1965) (the Court held a Connecticut statute 
unconstitutional for violating the privacy rights of married people). The statute criminalized the use of 
any contraceptive. Id. at 480. In a five-four decision, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, reasoned 
that the Bill of Rights created a penumbra of privacy rights that establish a zone of privacy for all persons 
protected by the Constitution. Id. at 484. In particular, Justice Douglas cited to the Court's holding in 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which referred to the Fourth Amendment as creating a "right to 
privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people." Id. at 
485.  
124 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19. 
125 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (1902). 
126 Id.
127 New York Civil Rights Law,  Sec. 50. Right  of Privacy.  “A person, firm or corporation that uses for 
advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person 
without having  first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or 
guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.” Id. 
128 Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Company, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).  
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law right of privacy, and the first Restatement of Torts recognized this common-law right 
in 1939.129 
More recently, Professor Lawrence Tribe described the essence of an individual’s 
right to privacy, the "right to be left alone," as "nothing less than society’s limiting 
principle . . . . It is a right which has meaning only within the social environment from 
which it would provide some degree of escape.”130 In 1960, Dean William Prosser 
authored a seminal article on privacy that compiled a mixture of privacy tort cases 
decided since the publication of the Warren and Brandeis article.131 In his influential 
article, Prosser argued that the invasion of privacy tort, designed by Warren and 
Brandeis, was actually comprised of four distinct categories of tort privacy.132 Prosser 
labeled these torts as intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false 
light, and appropriation.133 Drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts subsequently 
incorporated Prosser's four privacy tort definitions into the Restatement's privacy 
sections.134 Courts in most states have recognized Prosser's privacy torts, and many 
courts have adopted language directly from the Restatement sections.135 In several 
jurisdictions, courts have accepted the three privacy torts of intrusion upon seclusion, 
public disclosure of private facts, and appropriation; however, some courts have excluded 
 
129 Restatement (First) of Torts (1939).  
130 See generally Lawrence Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 1302 (West Publishing Company, 2d ed. 
1988). See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 386 (1960) (describing privacy torts 
recognized in 47 states); see W. Prosser, W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert K. Keeton & David G., 
Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 849-869 (West Group 5th ed. 1984).  
131 Prosser, id.
132 See Prosser, id. at 389 (establishing existence of four separate torts under privacy right). 
133 See Prosser, id. at 389 (listing four different privacy torts). The categories are described in the following 
way: intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; public disclosure of 
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the 
public eye; appropriation, for defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness.  
134 See McClurg, supra note 15, at 998 (discussing inclusion of four tort definitions into Restatement 
(Second) of Torts). See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652A-652E (1976) (listing actionable privacy 
torts). 
135 See McClurg, supra note 15, at 1036.  
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the tort of false light.136 Nearly every jurisdiction recognizes some form of a tortious right 
of privacy.137 
Prosser's review of intrusion upon seclusion case law revealed a variety of cases, 
some allowing recovery for physical intrusion and others extending beyond physical 
intrusion.138 According to Prosser, the privacy tort of intrusion overlapped with the torts 
of trespass and intentional infliction of emotional distress.139 Further, Prosser derived 
two limiting factors from the case law that would separate tortious intrusion from non-
tortious intrusions.140 First, a reasonable person must find the intrusion offensive or 
objectionable;141 second, the intrusion must be into something private in nature.142 Under 
the second limiting factor, Prosser drew a strong distinction between protection in a 
private location and a lack of protection in public spaces.143 The article explicitly stated 
that taking a photograph of a person in a public place or on a public street would not 
 
136 See McClurg, supra note 15, at 998 (listing jurisdictions that recognize intrusion, disclosure, and 
appropriation torts). 
137 See McClurg, supra note 15, at 998 (explaining that most jurisdictions have adopted some form of tort 
action protecting right of privacy). 
138 See Prosser, supra note 130, at 389-390 (summarizing cases of physical and non-physical intrusion). 
Physical intrusion cases include intrusion into a home, a hotel room, a woman's stateroom on a 
steamboat, and a shopping bag at a store. See id. at 389 (listing cases of physical intrusion). Non-physical 
intrusion cases include eavesdropping through wiretapping and microphones, peering into windows of 
homes, and prying into a bank account; see id. at 390 (listing cases of non-physical intrusion). 
139 See Prosser, supra note 130 at 389-390 (suggesting recognition of independent tort accomplishes same 
result).  
140 See Prosser, supra note 130, at 390-391 (discussing limiting factors). 
141 See Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., supra note 36, at 227 (stating plaintiffs' allegation that republished 
photograph of pose invaded right of privacy). The plaintiffs actually filed two separate right of privacy 
claims based upon this photograph. See Prosser, supra note 130, at 407 (discussing two distinct right of 
privacy claims). In Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co. (Gill I), the plaintiffs asserted the publication of the 
photograph violated the plaintiffs' right of privacy by depicting the couple's pose as the "wrong" kind of 
love in a written caption appearing below the picture. See Gill v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 275, 
(1952) (reviewing plaintiffs' factual basis for their right of privacy claim). The Supreme Court of 
California decided the plaintiffs' complaint stated a cause of action under a right of privacy claim based 
on the publication of the photograph, which characterized the couple as "dissolute and immoral and 
robbed them of public esteem." Gill v. Curtis Publ’g Co., id. at 281. Prosser placed the claim in Gill I in 
the privacy tort law category of "false light in the public eye." Prosser, supra note 130, at 407 
(categorizing Gill decisions into two separate privacy tort groups). Prosser classified Gill v. Hearst 
Publishing Co. (Gill II) in the category of public disclosure of private facts.  
142 See Prosser, supra note 130 at 391 (listing second limiting factor). 
143 Id. at 391 (discussing limitation of recovery in public setting). 
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qualify as actionable under the privacy tort of intrusion.144 In an age of wirelessly 
networked wearable computers, would a court using the same principles as developed by 
Prosser conclude that an image recorded in a public place, analyzed, and uploaded to the 
internet was an invasion of privacy under the tort of intrusion? Clearly, since Prosser’s 
seminal article was published, the ability of  technology to invade a person’s privacy has 
increased several fold, and in some cases the law on privacy has adapted to changes in 
technology as witnessed by state and federal statutes,145 and state constitutions which 
include a right to privacy.146 However, even with changes in the law designed to protect 
an individual’s privacy under specific circumstances,147 the law has not adequately 
changed to protect the privacy of  individuals once they enter a public place in an age of 
wirelessly networked, video-based, wearable computers- especially given that such 
systems can be used to track an individuals movements and pair personal information 
about an individual to their image posted on the internet.  
Of significance to video-based wearable computers, was Prosser's conclusion that 
there can be no intrusion of privacy in a public place; this conclusion rested on two 
premises:148 (1) that a person effectively assumes a risk of scrutiny when entering a 
public place;149 and (2) that there was no distinguishable difference between merely 
observing a person and taking their photograph. However, recent technology may have 
changed the premises under which Prosser concluded that an individual in a public place 
may not claim a right of privacy from intrusion. For example, related to the first premise, 
 
144 See id. at 391-392 (describing such as analogous public locations). 
145 See Advanced Electronics Group, Inc., supra note 63. 
146 See infra note 254.  
147 Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681; Drivers Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 
(1994). 
148 See McClurg, supra note 15, at 1036 (stating conclusion based on implicit and explicit premises).   
149 See id. (observing assumption of risk of public inspection as implicit premise). 
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given the ability of video-based wearable computers to record a person’s image, search 
databases, and upload the person’s image to the internet, a danger associated with 
networked wearable computers could be the pairing of inaccurate or highly personal 
information to an individual’s  image. Such a result could lead to a form of “digital 
scarlet letter” attached to the individual’s image, accessible by millions on the internet. 
Regarding Prosser’s second premise, video systems equipped with facial recognition 
software and wireless internet access will allow far more to be known about an individual 
than can be discerned by simply looking at a still photograph. That is, given the extensive 
information about each person that is searchable on the internet, including medical and 
financial records, phone records, biographical and family information, and employment 
histories, the potential to know far more than just what a person presents to the public 
when entering a public space is entirely possible once the person’s identity is known.  
In an early case, decided well before wirelessly networked video-based wearable 
computers were developed, the court in Gill v. Hearst Publishing150 provided support for 
Prosser's conclusions regarding a lack of privacy in public places.151 This privacy case 
arose when a photographer took a photograph of a couple in a romantic pose at the 
Farmers' Market in Los Angeles.152 The couple asserted that the photograph published in 
a magazine without their consent violated their right of privacy.153 The Gill court decided 
that the couple waived their right of privacy when they voluntarily assumed an amorous 
 
150 Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 40 Cal.2d at 229. 
151 Id. at 441. 
152 See Prosser, supra note 130, at 391-392 (arguing photographs taken in public places merely record 
which is similar to written description). Prosser cited Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co. for the proposition 
that photographs taken in a public space do not intrude into a person's privacy.  
153 See Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 40 Cal.2d  224. Photojournalist took a photograph of the plaintiffs at their 
place of work, a confectionery and ice cream concession in the Farmers' Market. The photo captures an 
image of a young man and woman seated with the man's arm around the woman while the woman 
focuses intently upon a notebook.  
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pose in a public setting.154 Additionally, the court concluded that the photograph "did not 
disclose anything which until then had been private, but rather only extended knowledge 
of the particular incident to a somewhat larger public than had actually witnessed it at the 
time of occurrence."155 Clearly the use of facial recognition software coupled with the 
ability of a computing system to search vast databases almost instantaneously, and to pair 
that information to a particular individual, goes far beyond the alleged invasion of 
privacy considered by the Gill court and thus can be distinguished from the facts 
presented in Gill. A court deciding whether an individual using a wearable computer 
equipped with facial recognition software violates an individual’s privacy, may find the 
increased intrusiveness of a wirelessly networked wearable computer with facial 
recognition software actionable under tort law.    
 Prosser drew a similar distinction between public and private facts in his review 
of the second privacy tort of public disclosure of private facts.156 The public disclosure of 
embarrassing private facts, similar to intrusion, requires intrusion into something that is 
secret, secluded, or private.157 Additionally, the disclosure tort measures the matter made 
public using a reasonable person standard.158 In the case of wearable computers, would a 
reasonable person expect when entering a public place that their image would be filmed 
and uploaded to the internet viewable by millions of people around the world? And 
 
154 Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 40 Cal.2d  224. 
155 See Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co, 40 Cal.2d  224 (concluding couple's romantic pose in public market place 
functioned as waiver of privacy right). The Supreme Court of California emphasized the voluntary nature 
of the plaintiffs' action in a public setting in its analysis showing that the pose, and the photograph, by 
extension, reveals a public fact and not a private fact. Id. 
156 Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co, 40 Cal.2d  224 at 445. 
157 See Prosser, supra note 130, at 407 (explaining common feature between intrusion and disclosure 
privacy torts). 
158 See Prosser, supra note 130, at 396-397 (limiting scope of tort to published matters that seem offensive 
and objectionable to reasonable person). 
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would a reasonable person expect that their image posted on the internet without their 
consent would contain personal information?  
On the issue of the reasonable person standard, in Miller v. National Broadcasting 
Co.,159 the court held that a heart attack victim's wife could sue a local television news 
producer when a camera crew entered her bedroom along with paramedics. The court 
concluded that a valid cause of action existed against the television network and the news 
producer for invasion of privacy.160 The court also concluded that reasonable people 
could see this intrusion as highly offensive.161 However, in many cases, if the information 
disclosed is newsworthy, an individual claiming a right from intrusion onto secret, 
secluded, or private information would lose as the disclosure of private facts tort is 
balanced against the First Amendment's protection of freedom of the press using a 
"newsworthiness" test.162 In such cases, Courts will often strike that balance in favor of 
the First Amendment's highly protected freedom of the press.163 Therefore, to the extent 
that an individuals facial image captured and posted on the web by a wearable computer 
 
159 Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 187 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1482-1487 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
160 See id. at 678-681. Also, under Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) the constitutional guaranty of 
expression applies equally to the publication of a news report as to an entertainment feature. 
161 Miller, 187 Cal.App.3d at 679. 
162 Geoff Dendy, The Newsworthiness Defense to Public Disclosure Tort, 85 Ky. L.J. 147, 151 (1997). See 
Ellen Alderman & Caroline Kennedy, The Right to Privacy, at 166 (Knopf 1995) (explaining use of 
"newsworthiness" test to strike balance between disclosure tort and First Amendment's free press rights). 
A plaintiff must prove that the private matter published was not a matter of "legitimate concern to the 
public" to win a public disclosure tort case. Id. The two main defenses to the invasion of privacy tort are 
consent and newsworthiness; "Consent is easily asserted where the plaintiff in the private facts suit had 
knowledge of the contents of the disclosure and acquiesced to its publication," while the definition of 
newsworthiness is subject to a variety of judicial interpretations. Id. Generally speaking, newsworthiness 
"amounts to a showing that the public has a legitimate interest in the disclosed fact, and, if established, 
precludes any recovery under the private facts tort." Id. 
163 See Alderman & Kennedy, id, at 166 (noting that satisfying "newsworthiness" test creates a high burden 
because courts have construed newsworthy broadly). 
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is newsworthy, the First Amendment may serve as a defense to the publication of the 
image.164 
The first constitutional challenge of the private facts tort addressed by the 
Supreme Court was in Cox Broadcasting Corp v. Cohn.165 Here the Court acknowledged 
the need for the right to privacy but noted that the private facts tort "most directly 
confronts the constitutional freedoms of speech and press."166 Limiting its decision to the 
narrow issue at bar, the Court held that a state may publish a rape victim's identity 
obtained from judicial documents that are open to public inspection, provided the 
information is accurate.167 By failing to address the broader question of whether the 
publication of truthful information could ever be punished, the Cox decision merely 
reaffirmed that the private facts tort addresses the disclosure of private, truthful 
facts.168 In Florida Star v. B.J.F., the Supreme Court invoked the First Amendment to 
find no liability for a newspaper who published the name of a rape victim received from 
a police department press release.169 However, the Court expressly rejected the 
newspaper's broad claim that the press could never be held liable for publishing the 
truth.170 As the Cox case was decided over 30 years ago, the issue a court may have to 
decide today is whether a rape victims identity, if paired to the facts of the rape, and 
posted on the internet by a person using a wirelessly networked wearable computer, 
would result in an invasion of the victim’s privacy.  If the court determines that the 
 
164 The court may also determine if the internet cite in which the image is posted constitutes a news 
publication. 
165 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
166 John A. Jurata, Jr., The Tort That Refuses to Go Away: The Subtle Reemergence of Public Disclosure of 
Private Facts, 36 S.D. L. Rev. 489, 494 (1999); Prosser, supra note 130, at 386-388 (quoting Cox, id. at 
489). 
167 Jurata, id. at 499; see also Cox, supra note 165, at 491-496. 
168 Jurata, id. at 500. 
169 Id.; see also Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
170 Jurata, supra note 167, at 501, see also Florida Star, id. at 532. 
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information was not newsworthy and consent was not given, it may conclude that under 
tort law the individuals privacy had been violated; however, the “newsworthy” test is a 
high bar for plaintiffs to overcome.   
Prosser's third privacy tort consisted of publicity that placed a person in a false 
light.171 The false light tort guards against an objectionable false portrayal of a person.172 
Prosser noted two typical false light circumstances: a publisher who uses a person's 
picture to illustrate a book or article when that person has no connection with the article, 
and a police department which includes a non-convicted person's name, photo, and 
fingerprints among a group of convicted criminals.173 Prosser observed that the false light 
tort overlapped greatly with defamation.174 Since a video-based wearable computer 
system may project false or inaccurate information about an individual, or distort the 
video image of a person posted on the internet, such a result may be actionable under the 
tort of placing a person in a false light. As discussed in the following sections of the 
article critical issues in defining whether a tort is actionable will be the consent or lack 
there of, provided by the individual whose image is captured by a wearable computer 
system; as well as the status of the person filmed in the public place.   
 
171 See Prosser, supra note 130, at 398-401 (discussing third form of privacy tort that protects person's 
reputation); see also Alderman & Kennedy, supra note 162, at 195-197 (comparing false light tort with 
defamation law). 
172 See Prosser, supra note 130, at 398-400 (explaining false light tort's purpose in protecting reputation 
interest). The false portrayal must also be objectionable under the reasonable person standard.  
173 See Prosser, supra note 130, at 399-400 (describing examples of previous false light torts). 
174 See Prosser, supra note 130, at 400 (observing significant overlap between false light tort and 
defamation requiring publication of false information); see also Alderman & Kennedy, supra note 162, at 
195-197 (discussing different standards applied by states to distinguish between false light and 
defamation actions). 
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The fourth privacy tort, “appropriation,” prohibits the unlawful use of a person's 
name or identity for a defendant's benefit or advantage.175 This fourth tort of invasion of 
privacy differs significantly from the other three torts because appropriation deals with a 
proprietary interest as opposed to a personal privacy interest.176 This tort often assists 
celebrities in protecting the commercial value of their "right of publicity."177 Of relevance 
for video-based wearable computers and privacy, the right of publicity cause of action 
was brought forth in a case involving the videotaping of a young woman whose image 
appeared in the video titled “Girls Gone Wild- College Girls Exposed.”178 The facts of 
the case indicated that while on a public street, the plaintiff was encouraged by a 
videographer to remove her clothes and expose areas of her body.179 Some time later, she 
discovered that two minutes of footage taken of her appeared in the “Girls Gone Wild- 
College Girls Exposed” video, and two to three seconds of censored clips of the plaintiff 
were being used in television commercials to advertise the videos.180 The plaintiff 
brought suit under Florida's statutory version of the right of publicity, section 540.08.181 
Section 540.08 of the Florida Statute prohibits the unauthorized publication "for purposes 
of trade or for any commercial or advertising purpose the name, portrait, photograph or 
other likeness of any natural person without the express written or oral consent to such 
 
175 See Prosser, supra note 130, at 401-407 (discussing appropriation tort protecting against prohibited use 
of person's identity for third person's benefit).  
176 See Prosser, supra note 130, at 406 (contrasting proprietary protection of exclusive use of person's name 
or likeness with other three torts' protection of personal privacy). 
177 See Prosser, supra note 130, at 406-407 (explaining creation of "right of publicity" out of appropriation 
statute); see also Alderman & Kennedy, supra note 162, at 221-222 (detailing case examples when 
celebrities protected their "right of publicity"). 
178 Lane v. MRA Holdings, 242 F.Supp.2d 1205 (MDFla. 2002). 
179 Id. at 1209.
180 Id. at 1210. 
181 FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (West 2002) (providing "No person shall publish, print, display or otherwise 
publicly use for purposes of trade or for any commercial or advertising purpose the name, portrait, 
photograph or other likeness of any natural person without the express written or oral consent 
to such use given by . . . such person."). 
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use given by such person.182 The defendant, argued its videos were expressive works, 
like motion pictures, aiming to entertain,183 and that the documentaries showing real 
women in actual public places were entitled to First Amendment protection.184 The court 
agreed and found the Girls Gone Wild video to be "irrefutably" an expressive work 
created solely to entertain.185 
What the above discussion indicates is that there is presently no appropriate cause 
of action under tort law for an intrusion into a person’s privacy when they enter a public 
place and their image is recorded, analyzed, and uploaded to the internet by an individual 
using a wearable computer. However, if broadly defined, the concept of information 
privacy may involve an individual's personal information and his ability to control that 
information; if so, then the above capabilities of wearable computers represents a 
significant means to violate the information privacy rights of an individual once they 
have entered a public place.  
STATUS OF THE PERSON IN THE PUBLIC PLACE 
When considering whether an individual’s privacy in a public place is violated 
when their image is filmed by a wearable computer, uploaded to the internet, and paired 
to personal information about the individual, the status of the person filmed must be 
considered. The consideration of the status of the individual once they enter a public 
place is especially important if the defendant in a privacy suit relies on a 
“newsworthiness” defense. Generally, those who have achieved a marked reputation or 
 
182 FLA. STAT., id. 
182 See id. 
183 See Stephen Van Drake, Girls Gone Wild' Cases Test Constitution, available at 
http://washington.bizjournals.com/southflorida/stories/2002/08/12/story4.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). 
184 Id. 
185 Lane, 242 F.Supp.2d 1205.  
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notoriety by appearing before the public can expect that their accomplishments and way 
of life will be the subject of print, radio, or television attention.186 Therefore, public 
figures have to some extent lost the right to privacy in public places and are thus subject 
to fair comment and criticism by the media.187 In this regard, the Fifth Circuit has noted 
that one of the public interest privileges in reporting private facts is to report truthful facts 
concerning public figures.188 
The Restatement holds that "one who voluntarily places himself in the public eye, 
by engaging in public activities, or by assuming a prominent role in institutions or 
activities having general economic, cultural, social or similar public interest, or by 
submitting himself or his work for public judgment, cannot complain when he is given 
publicity that he has sought, even though it may be unfavorable to him."189 No right of 
privacy remains for the public figure in relation to his public activities and appearances 
since these are no longer private affairs.190 However, while no cause of action exists 
regarding revelations involving the public figure relating to his famous status, liability 
may arise when the interest of the public exceeds the range of information that would 
otherwise be considered private.191 In fact, one California court has held that public 
figures are entitled to keep some information about their domestic activities and sexual 
 
186 Gary Williams, On the QT and Very Hush Hush: A Proposal to Extend California's Constitutional Right 
to Privacy to Protect Public Figures from Publication of Confidential Personal Information, 19 Loy. 
L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 337, 347 (1999). See Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ'n, Inc., 201 Cal.App.2d 733, 745-746 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1962); see 44 N.Y. Jur 2D Defamation and Privacy § 323 (2003) ("a person who, by his 
accomplishments, fame, or mode of life, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a 
legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, may be said to have become a public 
figure."); see also 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 193 (2002).  
187 See Carlisle Fawcett Publications, 20 Cal.App.2d 733. See generally 62A AM. JUR. 2d Privacy § 193 
(2002); Briscoe v. Readers' Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971). 
188 Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980). 
189 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. e (1977). 
190 Id. 
191 Id.
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relations private.192 Further, California's has an anti-paparazzi law that protects a public 
figures privacy against journalists who might engage in either physical or constructive 
trespasses to obtain images of, as the statute puts it, "personal or familial activities."193 
However, the statute does not seem applicable to the use of wirelessly networked 
wearable computers that are used to record an individual in a setting other than their 
home as it does not cover activities on public streets. The California law reveals a 
deficiency in privacy law as it exists today; while it may be permissible to film a public 
figure once they enter a public place, in some cases, the publication of personal 
information about the individual could result in liability. In the past such actions, the 
filming of an individual, and the publication of private facts about an individual occurred 
at separate times, therefore, the law could separate the two in regards to privacy, now 
with wearable computers, the recording and publication can occur almost simultaneously, 
yet no current law accounts for this capability.194 
Two early cases that are often quoted have divergent views of the public figure's 
relation to the private facts tort. In Melvin v. Reid, the plaintiff was a former prostitute 
who had been acquitted of murder.195 Subsequently, Melvin turned her life around and 
lived respectably in the private sector for many years in a community that had no 
 
192 Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal.App.3d 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
193 Cal. Civ. Code 1708.8, California Anti-Paparazzi Legislation  (2004). The law takes which took effect 
January 1, 2006, triples the amount of damages a celebrity can sue a photographer for, as well as making 
employers liable for the first time. Further, the photographers could also be required to disgorge any 
profits they make from the offending pictures. Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Suing the Media, 
Supporting the First Amendment: The Paradox of Neville Johnson and the Battle for Privacy, 67 Alb. L. 
Rev. 1097, 1109 (2004).  
194 See generally Woodrow Barfield & Thomas Caudell (eds), Fundamentals of Wearable Computers and 
Augmented Reality (Lawrence Erlbaum Press, 1998). If the individual with the wearable computer is 
using an opaque visual display (see Mann supra note 25), then information from the wirelessly 
networked wearable computer can be projected into the real world and merged with physical objects.  If 
only one person viewed the display, the court may conclude no cause of action, however, it is possible 
that several individuals with wearable computers could access the recorded image paired with personal 
facts if they had networked computers. 
195 Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931). 
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knowledge of her past.196 However, her history was revealed in a movie about the 
murder case that used her actual maiden name.197 The court held that the creation of the 
movie violated her right to privacy because she had successfully reclaimed her private 
figure status.198 The use of wearable computers with facial recognition capabilities could 
make it much more difficult for an individual to reclaim their private life once they had 
left the limelight as numerous “watching eyes” could be ever vigilant once they were 
programmed to search for particular individuals. However, in a case showing the law in 
this area is unsettled, the Second Circuit determined in Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., that 
a reclusive former child prodigy who had hidden from the media for years was not a 
private figure.199 Sidis sued The New Yorker magazine after he was featured and mocked 
in a "where is he now" article, but the court held that his public figure status had not 
diminished with the passing of time.200 In contrast to the Melvin decision,201 the Sidis 
decision seems to stand for the premise that at some point the public interest in obtaining 
information becomes dominant over the individual's desire for privacy.202 
Involuntary public figures, are persons who have not sought public attention but 
who have become "news" as the result of their involvement in or association with an 
otherwise newsworthy event.203 This category includes crime victims, accident victims, 
accused criminals, and people who perform heroic acts.204 Additionally, those who are 
 
196 Id. at 91. 
197 Id. at 91. 
198 Id. at 93. 
199 Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940). 
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201 Melvin, 297 P. 91. 
202 Sidas, 113 F.2d 806. 
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related to voluntary public figures gain involuntary public figure status.205 The Seventh 
Circuit opined that involuntary public figures have no legal right to regain their private 
status as long as the newsworthy events that made them public figures remain in the 
public interest.206 The court noted that even if these people do not desire publicity and 
would prefer that their experiences remain private, they are not equipped with the legal 
means to do so.207 However, in Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co, the Third Circuit remarked 
that the invasion of privacy rights of involuntary public figures is not without limits.208 
The case concerned a young girl who had been involved in a car accident at age ten and 
had the misfortune of being photographed at that time.209 At a later date, another 
magazine published the picture from the accident and the victim sued for invasion of 
privacy.210 Although ultimately finding for the publishers, the court declared that the 
plaintiff's life may not be subjected to continuous public scrutiny and would only risk 
attention in situations closely related to the initial car accident.211 
Another type of figure that may be found in a public place are private figures; this 
category represents the vast majority of people who could be filmed by a wearable 
computer once they entered a public place. While intuitively, private figures should have 
a greater expectation of privacy than public figures, most jurisdictions do not consider the 
status of the plaintiff in determining newsworthiness.  The Supreme Court has stated, in 
dicta, that the risk of exposure to public view is an "essential incident of life in a society 
which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press," so even private 
 
205 Id.
206 Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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208 Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951).     
209 Id. at 974-975. 
210 Id. at 975. 
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citizens' rights of privacy are difficult to protect.212 Arguably, the tendency of the courts 
to favor the press over individuals, coupled with privacy-seeking people's reluctance to 
broadcast their private facts in court, has prevented the full development of the private 
facts tort.213 To this end, when the plaintiff in a private facts tort is a private figure, the 
"right to be let alone" must still be balanced against the public interest in the 
dissemination of news and information, as well as the constitutional guarantees of 
freedom of speech and of the press.214 
The right of privacy's main objective is to protect private life, and it is determined 
by a reasonable person standard.215 In other words, an allegedly objectionable 
publication must offend an "ordinary man."216 This standard for private citizens in public 
places, rather than the standard for public figures that seek and enjoy publicity, arguably 
assists the protection of private citizens who desire to be left alone.217 As noted 
previously, once an individual enters a public place, they do not expect to also enter 
cyberspace where vast online databases can be searched to discover personal information 
about the individual. In addition to the apparent benefits to private figures' privacy, the 
reasonable person standard has the practical advantage of limiting the amount of 
frivolous and extraneous information that can be reported about them; that is, things done 
or said by public figures are more likely to serve the public in an educational or 
newsworthy way than those said or done by private figures.218 Much of the above 
discussion concerning the status of an individual entering public places centered on the 
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press’s right to publish newsworthy information. Therefore, in the context of networked 
wearable computers, the courts will have to determine the extent to which recordings of 
individuals in public places constitutes news; if the image constitutes news, then the 
newsworthy event will trump an individuals right to privacy in a public place.   
FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW AND PRIVACY 
 The Fourth Amendment has been the main source of protection for an individual’s 
privacy when a government actor is involved. The following section reviews Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure law in the context of privacy in public places. In the early 
twentieth century, the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was geared 
toward the protection of property.219 The Court's inclination to protect property quite 
clearly is reflected in its 1928 decision in Olmstead v. United States.220 In Olmstead, the 
Supreme Court held that use of a wiretap to intercept a private telephone conversation 
was not a "search" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.221 One of the grounds on 
which the Court justified its result was that there had been no physical intrusion into the 
person's home.222 Under Olmstead's narrow view of the Fourth Amendment, the 
amendment was not applicable in the absence of physical intrusion, i.e., not applicable to 
public places.223 Thus, without trespass or seizure of any material object, surveillance 
was beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the Olmstead Court.   
 However, in its well-known decision in Katz v. United States, decided 39 years 
after Olmstead, the Supreme Court rejected Olmstead's "trespass" doctrine, articulating, 
in its place, a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence based on the protection of individual 
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privacy.224 In Katz, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment protected people, not 
places: "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, 
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as 
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."225 
Thus, the Court held that physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is not 
necessary before a search and seizure can be held to violate the Fourth Amendment. 
According to the Court in Katz, "once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment 
protects people-and not simply "areas"- against unreasonable searches and seizures it 
becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or 
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure."226 
Changing technology precipitated the shift from protection of property to 
protection of privacy, and in 1968, just one year after Katz, Congress passed Title III of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act authorizing microphone surveillance or 
wiretapping for law enforcement purposes, and requiring a warrant  based on probable 
cause, prior to such surveillance or wiretapping.227 Specifically, Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act as enacted regulated the interception of electronic, 
wire, and oral communication, but not video surveillance.228 However, as federal courts 
have stated,229 "video surveillance is more invasive of privacy than audio surveillance, 
'just as a strip search is more invasive than a pat-down search'"; but Congress has not 
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made this distinction.230 Therefore, there seems to be a deficiency in the law because 
video surveillance is unregulated by Title III, even though video is arguably more 
intrusive than aural (audio) surveillance.231 
The use of video surveillance itself in the context of search and seizure law has 
been considered by different jurisdictions. The Sixth Circuit in U.S. v. Torres,232 declined 
to hold that video surveillance was unconstitutional per se under the Federal 
Constitution's Fourth Amendment, and, more specifically, rejected the proposition that 
secretly videotaping in private places could never be considered reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment. It was not meant to suggest, the court cautioned, that the Fourth 
Amendment was to be interpreted as allowing such surveillance to be used as generally as 
less intrusive techniques. A search could be unreasonable, though conducted under an 
otherwise valid warrant, the Court stated, if the search intruded on personal privacy to an 
extent disproportionate to the likely benefits from obtaining fuller compliance with the 
law.233 Further, it was noted by the Ninth Circuit in U.S. v. Taketa,234 that video 
surveillance did not, in itself, violate a reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of 
the Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment. And while expressing concern over the 
high degree of intrusiveness that was inherent in video surveillance, the court in People v. 
Teicher,235 held that such surveillance was not per se unreasonable under the Federal 
Constitution's Fourth Amendment so as to require its prohibition in all circumstances. 
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Close scrutiny must be given to any application for a warrant permitting video 
surveillance, the court stated, but the Fourth Amendment did not mandate an absolute ban 
on such surveillance any more than it did with electronic eavesdropping.236 It was also 
held in State v. Clemmons237 that video surveillance as a method of investigation did not 
in itself violate a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Federal Constitution's 
Fourth Amendment, as the police could record what they could view with their naked 
eyes. Even though wearable computers can record and also analyze facial images, courts 
would likely hold that the analysis of a person’s face using facial recognition software, if 
done in a public place, is not a search under the Fourth Amendment, as under Clemmons,
all that would be recorded and analyzed is the same as what can be analyzed with the 
naked eyes. However, if the facial image was uploaded to the internet and paired with 
personal information, this change in facts may be sufficient for a court to find a violation 
of an individual’s privacy. 
A wearable computer system may contain sensors such as cameras, microphones, 
infrared and thermal heat sensors.238 Would the information derived from the sensors 
constitute a search if performed by a government actor? In Kyllo v. U.S. the question 
considered by the Court was whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a 
private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home 
constituted a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.239 The scan of 
Kyllo's home showed that the roof over the garage and a side wall of petitioner's home 
were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and substantially warmer than 
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neighboring homes. The Court concluded that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology 
any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been 
obtained without physical "intrusion into a constitutionally protected area," constituted a 
search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.240 
On the basis of this criterion, the Court concluded that the information obtained by the 
thermal imager in this case was the product of a search.241 Therefore, when the 
”Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the 
home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the 
surveillance is a "search" and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”242 
However, given the predicted increased usage of wearable computers, equipped with 
sense enhancing technology, they may become sufficiently mainstream technology so as 
not to constitute a search in Fourth Amendment terms; especially if used to record what is 
in plain sight or brought to the public.243 
Although no court has ruled on the constitutionality of using wearable computers 
for purposes of surveillance by a government actor, the Katz doctrine leads to the nearly 
inevitable conclusion that the use of this technology - provided it occurs in a public place 
- is not a search.244 In order to find that surveillance of individuals in a public place is a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court would have to reconsider one of 
the central aspects of the Katz doctrine - that a person is only protected if she enjoys a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in her actions. When this standard is applied to activity 
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in the public sphere, it is hard to conclude that the Fourth Amendment is implicated. 
Therefore, government actors using wearable computers may not be in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment when filming individuals in public places. In contrast, the courts have 
determined that the search if performed in a person’s home and done by the media 
accompanying the police, does implicate the Fourth Amendment. For example, in 
“Reality TV” filming where the media accompanies law enforcement personnel in some 
variation of a "ride-along," if the media uses a video camera to record the police arrest 
and crime scene, the Fourth Amendment may be violated even if the individual is filmed 
in their own home.245 On point is Wilson v. Layne,246 where the Supreme Court held that 
media ride-alongs violated the Fourth Amendment when the media accompanied law 
enforcement officers into the person’s home.247 
VI. VIDEO VOYEURISM  
 
This section of the article focuses on the use of wirelessly networked phone 
cameras in the context of video voyeurism, an emerging area of concern for invasion of 
individual’s privacy in public places. Of interest to this article is that facial recognition 
software has been integrated into some phone cameras,248 and that research is underway 
using Bluetooth-enabled camera cell phones that would record where the caller is, what 
time they called, and who they are with.249 This later technology, which is being 
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developed at the University of California, Berkeley, in conjunction with Yahoo, is based 
on a central server that registers details sent by a cell phone when a photo is taken.250 
These include the nearest cell phone mast, the strength of the call signal and the time the 
photo was taken. The system also identifies other Bluetooth-enabled cell phones within 
range of the photographer and combines this with time and place information to create a 
shortlist of people who might be in the picture. This information can then be combined 
with facial-recognition software to identify the subjects from the shortlist, and to track the 
location of people. According to Professor Davis, a lead investigator on the project, facial 
recognition software on its own can only identify people with 43 per cent accuracy from 
the grainy shots taken by camera phones, but by combining facial recognition systems 
with context information the system may then correctly identify people 60 per cent of the 
time.251 The context information can also be combined with image-recognition software 
to identify places within photos.252 What this example illustrates is that wearable 
computer technology is converging such that it can not only record and analyze an 
individual’s facial image but also track the individual in public places. The combination 
of these technologies may pose a significant threat to an individual’s information privacy 
rights in public places. If we consider personal information to include where you are, who 
you are with, and what time you are there, especially if paired to other personal 
information about an individual that is searchable on the internet, this combination of 
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information may result in almost no privacy for any individual once they leave their 
house.     
An important question that must be addressed in the area of privacy rights 
resulting from wearable computers equipped with facial recognition software, especially 
if personal information is paired to the facial image, is the appropriate cause of action to 
pursue by the aggrieved party.  In some states, when a video camera is used to record an 
individual in an area where the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, an action 
may be brought forth under a video voyeurism statute;253 in other states there may be a 
right to privacy afforded in the state constitution.254 For example, California, Alaska, and 
Hawaii255 as well as other states, include a right to privacy in their respective state 
constitutions. And as noted in a previous section of this article, if the party doing the 
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filming is a government actor, the Fourth Amendment provides some, but limited, 
protection to individuals filmed in public places.256 
Recent cases in video voyeurism dealing with the video taping and subsequent use 
of an individual’s image without permission may provide some direction to the type of 
actions that may be pursued by a person filmed without permission by an individual with 
a wearable computer equipped with facial recognition software. Video voyeurism 
generally occurs when a person secretly films another person in an area where that person 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and has not consented to the observation.257 
Camera phones with wireless internet capabilities have been reported to be a voyeur's 
dream-come-true, pictures and even video can be shot "discreetly" and immediately 
emailed or uploaded to the internet.258 Some victims of video voyeurism have sought 
relief through the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.259 A court may 
hold a voyeur liable for causing severe emotional distress to a victim if the plaintiff can 
prove that the voyeur engaged in extreme or outrageous conduct and acted either 
intentionally or recklessly.260 Although some claims have been successful under this tort 
action,261 a plaintiff seeking relief from an unwanted picture may nevertheless find it 
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difficult to convince a trier of fact that an indecent photo of herself in the hands of only 
one voyeur has caused severe emotional distress. However, with wirelessly networked 
technology such as a cell phone or video-based wearable computer, an image may be 
almost instantaneously posted on the internet, so far more than one individual may view 
the image, and indeed voyeurs often post the images to web sites frequented by other 
voyeurs.  
In terms of additional causes of action, plaintiffs in video voyeurism cases have 
looked at Federal and state wiretapping statutes, but for the most part found them to be 
ineffective.262 These statutes impose liability for unauthorized audio communications, but 
not the recording of a video image.263 A few courts have, however, broadly interpreted 
"communication" within state statutes to include any exchange of thoughts, messages or 
information by a means other than spoken words.264 On the other hand, federal courts 
have yet to include silent video recordings within the Electronic Communications Privacy 
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Act.265 Therefore, video voyeurs can escape liability under wiretapping statutes by either 
photographing the victims or videotaping them without using sound.266 
To address the problem of cell phone video voyeurism, a recent bill signed into 
federal law267 was enacted to ban the use of camera-equipped phones when used to 
photograph or videotape a disrobed person without his or her consent in any place where 
there can be "a reasonable expectation of privacy."  The key language of the Federal 
statute is: 
“Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, 
has the intent to capture an image of a private area of an individual without their 
consent, and knowingly does so under circumstances in which the individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than one year, or both.” Title 18 § 1801.  
 
Some terminology and definitions in the Federal Video Voyeurism statute have 
relevance for a statute which would address information privacy violations involving a 
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wirelessly networked video-based wearable computer. For example, as described in the 
statute, to `capture' an image means to videotape, photograph, film, record by any means, 
or broadcast; whereas; `broadcast' means to electronically transmit a visual image with 
the intent such that it be viewed by a person or persons.268 However, a key term under the 
Federal Video Voyeurism Statute- `under circumstances in which that individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy' would need to be modified to accommodate 
information privacy in public places. Regarding an information privacy statute, a 
‘reasonable expectation of information privacy’ would need to be designed to protect a 
persons privacy who had entered a public place, was filmed by a wearable computer, and 
had their image posted on the internet along with personal information.  
A growing number of states have also enacting legislation to address the problem 
of video voyeurism.269 For example, New York State enacted legislation termed 
“Stephanie’s Law” that creates criminal penalties for acts of video voyeurism.270 
Specifically, Stephanie's Law creates criminal penalties for those who would use a 
mechanical, digital or electronic device to capture visual images of another person in a 
place where that person had a reasonable expectation of privacy and had not given his or 
her consent.271 Stephanie’s law also creates criminal penalties for those who disseminate, 
publish, or sell images of the intimate parts of another person's body. The legislation 
requires that a video voyeur who is caught using or installing a camera for sexual 
purposes, or in a bedroom, bathroom, or other specified rooms, would be subject to 
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presumptive registration with the State's Sex Offender Registry.  Under Stephanie’s law, 
a person with a wearable computer filming the intimate parts of another, would be liable 
just as would any other voyeur using video equipment. 
In New York, there is also a General Business Law statute that forbids an "owner 
or manager" of a premise to knowingly permit or allow a viewing device to be installed 
or maintained in such premise for the purpose of surreptitiously observing, or recording a 
visual image in, the interior of "any fitting room, restroom, toilet, bathroom, washroom, 
shower, or any room assigned to guests or patrons in a motel, hotel or inn."272 Under such 
a law, would the proprietor of the premise be required to ask an individual equipped with 
a video-based wearable computer to leave the premise? The proscribed act is a violation 
if the conduct is limited to "observing"; it is a felony if the conduct is "recording."273 The 
General Business Law applies only to the "owner or manager" of the premise, and the 
General Business Law prohibition does not apply to a "private dwelling" or to certain 
other locations which are covered by the Penal Law crimes.274 
In video voyeurism, the place and time when a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, is an important aspect of video voyeurism statutes and may turn 
out to be the one most litigated. The notion of a reasonable expectation of privacy is also 
central to the intrusion into a person’s privacy in a public place if one is considering the 
concept of information privacy. The “reasonable person” definition in video voyeurism 
statutes borrows the terminology from Fourth Amendment’s "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" case law.275 A "reasonable expectation of privacy" reflects whether the person 
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viewed has a subjective expectation of privacy at the time and place of the viewing, and 
if so, whether from an objective standpoint it is an expectation that accords with societal 
conventions. This article argues that personal information disseminated on the internet 
and paired to a person’s image would diverge from societal expectations of what privacy 
a reasonable person should expect when they enter a public place; and thus should be 
actionable.  
 Permitting one's self to be filmed with knowledge that you are being viewed is a 
form of implied consent. Therefore, there would be no "expectation of privacy" under an 
information privacy statute in knowingly exposing oneself to a person with a video-based 
wearable computer. Here the concept of physically exposing yourself to being filmed 
versus exposing an individual’s personal information when they enter a public place 
differs. While an individual may knowingly expose their image to the public once they 
enter a public place, they do not knowingly or purposively expose personal information 
about themselves when they enter a public place; the personal records of their affairs are 
expected to be kept private and “at home.” Based on Prosser’s analysis of tort law, the 
image recorded by the video-based wearable computer in a public place may be 
considered public information.  However, personal and private facts associated with the 
image, especially if posted on the internet would be considered personal, and nonpublic 
information. Essentially, with video-based wearable computer technology, once a person 
enters a public place, they may also unknowingly be entering cyberspace as their image 
may be recorded, analyzed, and uploaded to the internet. The law as currently developed, 
offers some privacy protection for cyberspace transactions on the internet, but does not 
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consider the combination of public and cyberspace privacy in the age of wirelessly 
wearable computers. 
 The video voyeurism statutes enacted in some states have already resulted in 
prosecution, and such prosecution may be illustrative for disputes that may involve 
wearable computers and privacy.  The road toward the Federal video voyeurism law 
began with two state cases, one in Louisiana and one in Washington State; in both, video 
technology was used to violate an individual’s privacy.  In the first case, Susan and Gary 
Wilson of Monroe, Louisiana discovered that a neighbor had installed hidden cameras in 
the Wilson’s master bedroom and bathroom.276 To the Wilson’s surprise, Louisiana 
authorities said their neighbor's actions were not criminal offenses under current state and 
federal law. After the Wilson’s learned their neighbor had similarly victimized others in 
the community, the couple urged their state representatives to change the law. In 1999, 
the Louisiana governor signed a bill making video voyeurism a felony.277 
The second case which influenced Federal law makers occurred in Washington 
State, where Richard Sorrells secretly aimed a video camera up a woman's skirt as she 
waited at an ice cream stand during a festival in 2000.278 The Washington State Supreme 
Court ruled that filming up women's skirts, though "disgusting and reprehensible," wasn't 
in violation of current state law.279 It overturned the convictions of Sorrells and another 
man, Glas, who was accused of taking photographs under women's skirts at a shopping 
mall.  In response to the outcome of these cases, in 2002, Washington state lawmakers 
changed the law to give legal recourse to people whose privacy was violated in public. 
 
276 Stephanie L. Brooke, Is Cyber Peeping Causing Future Shock? 4 Expository Magazine, available at 
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277 Louisiana, La. R. S. §14:284 (2002). 
278 See State of Washington v. Glas, 147 Wash.2d 410.   
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The new law was used to prosecute Jack Le Vu, the first known cell phone camera 
voyeur to be convicted in the United States.280 In 2003, Vu was seen in a Seattle area 
Safeway using a cell phone camera to covertly snap pictures beneath the skirt of a woman 
shopping next to him. Under the revamped Washington privacy law, Vu was successfully 
prosecuted and later pleaded guilty to one count of voyeurism.281 He was sentenced to 60 
days jail time and forced to register as a sex offender.282 
VII. REALITY FILMING, STILL PHOTOGRAPHS AND PRIVACY 
“Reality filming” and the use of photographs of individuals taken in public places 
are both areas where there have been disputes involving alleged invasions of privacy. 
Some aspects of the cases in these areas have “voyeuristic” components, and thus relate 
to the previous material in this article; however, each area brings up some new issues not 
covered in the previous section. Americans have long been fascinated with the personal 
affairs of other people, Warren and Brandeis spoke of this in their 1980’s article.283 
More recently, in the 1990’s an abundance of "reality" television shows which focused on 
the private lives of individuals appeared, including: COPS, I-Witness Video, Firefighters, 
Real Stories of the Highway Patrol, Emergency Response, and Rescue 911.284 For 
example, in the United States, camera crews often follow police and emergency 
personnel as well as use video surveillance cameras mounted on poles and buildings in 
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order to film individuals without their permission.285 Such programs highlight the 
extremely personal information that reality television may reveal about an individual, just 
as can video-based wearable computers.286 For example, in the mid 1990’s Langley 
Productions marketed a "too hot" for television version of COPS that the "censors would 
not let you see."287 The most graphic portions of the video showed a man who hung 
himself in his garage, a drive-by shooting victim dying in a car, a man running from his 
house on fire and the deceased bodies of an entire family including a baby in a 
crib.288 Another "reality" show placed a hidden microphone on a paramedic who aided a 
critically injured woman who could be heard begging for her life.289 Moreover, news 
tabloid shows and other news programs constantly use hidden cameras and microphones 
to expose the personal details of an individuals life.290 One commentator concluded that 
 
285 Another growing trend is the mounting of cameras on police cars and in police cars. C. Ron Allen, Boca 
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it seems that the voyeurism market has advanced to the point where cameras are so 
widespread, that people in public places are left with little, if any, privacy.291 
However, even given the extreme graphic content of the above examples, the law 
may under limited circumstances provide protection for a person’s privacy when they 
have been filmed in a public place. For example, in one case a plaintiff was able to 
recover for a photograph taken of her in public when an air jet blew her skirt over her 
head.292 The photographer sold the picture of the woman in her underwear to a 
newspaper which published the photograph on the front page of its paper.293 An 
important distinction made by the court was that the intrusion into privacy occurred the 
moment the photograph was taken, not when the photograph was published.294 The use 
of wearable computers by individuals in public places may easily result in similar 
recordings of an individual in a compromising position, and thus based on the above 
decision, may violate the person’s privacy at the moment of filming. In another case 
limiting the right to film an individual in a public place, the California Supreme Court in 
1998 ruled against the producers of On Scene: Emergency Response for videotaping 
conversations between a car-accident victim and a nurse on a medical evacuation 
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helicopter.295 The U.S. Supreme Court also ruled in 1999 that police may have violated 
the privacy rights of citizens by allowing Washington Post reporters to tag along when 
they questioned the parents of a criminal suspect in their home.296 While the crash scene 
itself was newsworthy and exempt from suit, the court ruled, the victim had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the helicopter.297 
But in most cases when a person has been filmed in a public place, the plaintiff’s 
privacy claim fails especially, if as noted previously, the defendant is able to successfully 
use a “newsworthy” defense. For example, a couple tried to sue the publisher of  “World 
Guide to Nude Beaches and Recreation” after he published a photograph of them on a 
nude beach.298 The Appellate Court in New York held that the matter was of some public 
interest, and the couple's picture was reasonably related to the subject; therefore, the 
couple was not allowed to recover.299 In another case, Jones v. Herald Post Co.,300 the 
plaintiff brought an action for the invasion of her privacy as a result of the publication of 
a picture that related to the death or her husband. The court, in denying the right of the 
plaintiff to recover, stated in part as follows: "The right of privacy may be defined as the 
right to live one's life in seclusion, without being subjected to unwarranted and undesired 
publicity. In short, it is the right to be let alone.”301 There are times, however, when one, 
whether willingly or not, becomes an actor in an occurrence of public or general interest, 
when this takes place, he emerges from his seclusion, and it is not an invasion of his right 
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of privacy to publish his photograph with an account of such occurrence.302 In a similar 
case, a Georgia newspaper published photographs of a murdered fourteen-year-old girl 
whose body was partially decomposed and wrapped in chains.303 A Georgia court held 
that the girls body was newsworthy and the girl's family could not maintain a cause of 
action.304 In a particularly egregious case which involved the newsworthiness of the 
story versus the privacy rights of the plaintiff, a woman's former husband kidnapped her, 
took her to an apartment, and stripped and raped her.305 The police arrived with camera 
crews, and although the woman attempted to cover herself with a dish towel, her 
photograph was published the next day in a newspaper.306 A Florida court seeming to 
conclude that voyeurism was a protected right, denied the woman damages, and held that 
the event was a newsworthy, emotion-packed drama to which others are attracted.307 
Based on the above court decisions, the courts take a liberal view as to what captures the 
publics interest; and if the court finds that the recorded incident is a matter of public 
interest, or matter of a public investigation, a publication in connection therewith will in 
most jurisdictions not constitute a violation of one's legal right of privacy. 
A few additional issues of relevance for video-based wearable computers is 
whether the recorded image is used for a commercial or noncommercial use, and whether 
the recorded image is used for a political or nonpolitical use. In a dispute involving the 
use of a photograph without permission, a multi-million dollar lawsuit was filed against a 
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political activists group and a political consulting firm for allegedly stealing a gay 
couple’s wedding photo and using it in a political ad.308 The suit alleged numerous 
complaints- that the use of the couple’s image without permission constituted an invasion 
of privacy, was libelous, placed them in a false light, violated their right of publicity, and 
constituted an intentional infliction of emotional distress.309 This particular case 
illustrates how the facts surrounding the case influence the direction of the litigation. To 
wit, when pictures and video are used in political ads, they are treated as fully protected 
speech under the First Amendment, and not as the less protected "commercial speech."310 
Moreover, when the claim involves speech on matters of public concern, courts generally 
reject the claim on First Amendment grounds.311 This discussion suggests that to the 
extent an image recorded by a wearable computer is used for a purpose protected by the 
First Amendment, such as political speech, it may not violate a person’s privacy.  
The case of Lane v. MRA Holdings, LLC,312 presented earlier in this article is 
representative of a recent trend in reality filming. The dispute involved the use of an 
image in a “Girls Gone Wild” commercials and video. The plaintiff argued that the use of 
the video in the film was not expected because she was told while being filmed by the 
cameraman that he was intending to make a film for his own personal use. According to 
the plaintiff, Lane, the cameraman represented to her that he would not show the video to 
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anyone who was not present at that time.313 The first three counts of Lane's claims were 
brought under Florida law against MRA for unauthorized publication in violation of 
common law invasion of privacy for commercial misappropriation of likeness and false 
light invasion of privacy.314 Under Florida law, the elements of common law invasion of 
privacy for commercial misappropriation of likeness, coincide with the elements of 
unauthorized publication of a name or likeness in violation of Fla. Stat. § 540.08.315 
MRA argued that Fla. Stat. § 540.08 absorbed the common law claim of invasion of 
privacy based upon a commercial misappropriation of likeness. However, section 6 of 
Fla. Stat. § 540.08 provides that the "remedies provided for in this section shall be in 
addition to, and not in limitation of the remedies and rights of any person under the 
common law against the invasion of her or his privacy."316 
Lane also asserted a claim against MRA for false light invasion of privacy. 
According to Lane, MRA's juxtaposition of her with other women exposing their genital 
areas, or engaging in extended topless and suggestive dancing portrayed her in a false 
light. The two essential elements for recovery under false light invasion of privacy are: 
(1) the false light must be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (2) the defendant 
must have acted either knowingly or in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the 
publicized material and the false light in which it would be placed.317 With regards to the 
first element the court concluded that although a reasonable jury could conclude that the 
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use of Lane's image and likeness in a video containing women exposing themselves is 
highly offensive, no reasonable jury could conclude that Girls Gone Wild or its marketing 
campaign with Sexy Sorority Sweethearts placed Lane in a false light.318 Foremost, the 
court reasoned that in the video, Lane is depicted truthfully and accurately as doing 
exactly what she did, exposing her breasts on a street in Panama City in exchange for a 
beaded necklace.319 Moreover, the court concluded, considering the nature of Lane's 
actions, the publication of her image in a video containing other women engaging in 
similar acts was neither unreasonable nor inaccurate.320 Altogether, MRA's juxtaposition 
of Lane with other women exposing themselves cannot give rise to the tort of false light 
invasion of privacy because the depiction of Lane was reasonable, accurate, and 
truthful.321 The court reasoned that if the publicity is an accurate portrayal of the public 
display, if the publicity is not unreasonable and false, then Lane has no actionable privacy 
interest, even if the publicity has caused embarrassment, offense, or damage.322 
VI.  TOWARDS AN INFORMATION PRIVACY STATUTE 
As shown above, current law dealing with video recordings in public places is 
represented by a patchwork of statutes and common law causes of action, with no 
specific law covering the capability of wearable computers to invade an individual’s 
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privacy in a public place.323 While in the past, a person who entered a public place was 
said to place themselves under the general scrutiny of the public’s eyes, the public’s 
ability to know personal information about an individual was limited to what their naked 
eyes could discern. However, networked wearable computers with facial recognition 
software has changed this basic premise; if an individual’s image can be identified and 
uploaded to the internet, a tremendous amount of personal information can be known and 
paired to a particular individual. Now days, a person entering public space, may 
unknowingly be entering cyberspace; yet the law on privacy has not adapted to this 
reality. In this regard, Professor Froomkin observed that as a result of modern 
surveillance technology, there was an erosion of the border separating the private from 
the public spheres.324 This article argues that in an age of wirelessly networked and 
video-based wearable computers, legislatures should enact a statute which would protect 
the information privacy rights of individuals in public places.325 
The right to information privacy as advocated in this article and by legal 
scholars,326 is not a new concept, in fact it was addressed by the U. S. Supreme Court in 
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Whalen v. Roe almost 30 years ago.327 The Whalen case involved the invasion of 
patients' privacy by a New York statute requiring physicians to submit copies of 
prescriptions for abused drugs to the state for inclusion in a centralized computer file.328 
While the Court upheld the statute, finding that New York's interest in experimenting 
with solutions to control the distribution of dangerous drugs was a legitimate exercise of 
the state's police power; still the Court affirmed the right of an individual to have his 
personal information kept private.329 The court stated: 
A final word about issues we have not decided. We are not unaware of the threat 
to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in 
computerized data banks or other massive government files. The collection of 
taxes, the distribution of welfare and social security benefits, the supervision of 
public health, the direction of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the 
criminal laws all require the orderly preservation of great quantities of 
information, much of which is personal in character and potentially embarrassing 
or harmful if disclosed. The right to collect and use such data for public purposes 
is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid 
unwarranted disclosures.330 
Later, in 1989, the Supreme Court described the right to privacy as encompassing 
"the individual's control of information concerning his or her person."331 More recently, 
Professor Kang adopted the Supreme Courts description of information privacy in his call 
for an “Information Privacy Act,” describing information privacy as an individual's 
personal information and his ability to control that information.332 As an extension to this 
concept, it has been argued that information privacy should include more than just control 
over personal information, but should also include information that expresses one’s 
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identity; for example, information that can be used to place individuals into categories.333 
Karas noted that under such an approach, when determining whether a privacy violation 
had occurred, “a court would consider whether one’s privacy as a consumer, a sexual 
being, a father, etc. had been invaded by a particular practice.”334 This idea seems to be 
compatible with the Fourth Amendment’s case law discussing the “standard of a 
reasonable person” to determine if an individual should have an expectation of privacy in 
a public place.335 However, under Karas’s view, the standard of a reasonable person 
within a particular category would have to be determined, as would the number and type 
of categories; such an approach may be unworkable unless the categories were limited 
and the procedure for identifying individuals within a category were clear and easily 
determined.      
As discussed in this article, given the capabilities of  wirelessly networked video-
based wearable computers with facial recognition software, and tracking technologies, 
much personal information about an individual can be known and paired to an 
individual’s image. On this point, one need not be concerned with just the capability of 
wearable computers to track individuals and invade their privacy, as Professor Schwartz 
has outlined, implantable chip technology can also be used to track a person and collect 
extensive and continuous personal data about them.336 Given the ability to track an 
individual, a particular type of wearable computer, those with opaque or see-through 
displays, may result in an even greater invasion of a person’s privacy than filming an 
individual and uploading their image to the internet. Wearable computers with opaque or 
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see-through displays may allow personal information to be directly “pasted” on an 
individual’s image as they move around public places.337 What is troublesome about such 
technology is that the ability to track a person’s movements and to pair personal 
information to an individual based on where they are at a given time, may provide useful 
information to stalkers, pedophiles, and other criminals.  Stalkers have been known to use 
video cameras to monitor their victims movements, which is often a precursor to a violent 
crime.338 On this point, some states have included language in their stalking statute 
which specifically mentions surveillance as an act of stalking.339 Further, pedophiles 
often like to know the location and identity of kids as kids move around public places in 
order to alert other pedophiles. The law on tracking individuals is unsettled, while an 
individual may not stalk a person, a Federal circuit has held that it is not a search under 
the Fourth Amendment for the police to place a GPS unit on a suspect’s car; in contrast, a 
New York State court ruled that such an act is a search.340 
In an age of wearable computers, based on privacy and safety concerns, there 
needs to be a comprehensive federal policy guaranteeing an individual the right to control 
the collection and distribution of their personal information once they enter a public 
place. Such a statue should include the ability to control the dissemination of location 
data and whether an individual’s image may be filmed, analyzed, and uploaded to the 
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internet. While these last categories of information- location data, and the video recording 
and identification of an individual’s image,  are normally not considered under the rubric 
of personal information- we have now entered a technological age where the identity of a 
person and their location are considered highly sought after information by marketers341 
and others who may use such information for nefarious reasons- thus the law ought to 
consider whether such information should be regulated.  
If a statute were to be enacted to protect an individuals information privacy rights 
in a public place, what would be the basic components of such a statute?  In the context 
of information privacy,  Kang discussed personal information as “information identifiable 
to the individual.”342 He also indicated that “personal” in the context of information did 
not necessarily mean sensitive, private, or embarrassing information, but that it described 
a relationship between the information and a person, i.e., information “identifiable to an 
individual.”343 Kang also specifically stated that biometric data constituted personal 
information about an individual.344 Clearly, facial recognition software implemented into 
a wearable computer performs a biometric analysis of a person’s face, and thus 
constitutes personal information under Kang’s reasoning- and thus would warrant 
protection under a privacy law statute.  In addition, borrowing from Fourth Amendment 
case law and Federal and state video voyeurism statutes,345 an information privacy law 
should be designed to protect an individual’s “reasonable expectation of information 
privacy” once they enter a public place. While it may be reasonable to expect to be seen 
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and identified in a public place by individuals who may directly view you, it is 
unreasonable to expect that you will be filmed, that your recorded image will be uploaded 
to the internet, and that personal information will be paired to your identity and location. 
As one aspect of privacy protection in a public place, personal information which may 
violate a persons privacy if posted on the internet, in a similar manner should also violate 
a person’s information privacy if paired to their image once they entered a public place. 
This type of information would include not only social security numbers, and medical 
records, but as noted above, information which could be used to track an individuals 
movements within public places.  
Professor Kang also distinguished between the concepts of “surveillance” and 
“casual observations,” arguing that a law too general might constrain causal observations 
made in public places, therefore Kang limited his proposed “Information Privacy Act” to 
cyberspace transactions.346 As emphasized in this article, video-based wearable 
computers equipped with facial recognition software and internet capabilities may be 
used to pair personal information to an individual’s image once they enter a public place. 
Given the capabilities of wirelessly networked wearable computers; an information 
privacy statute that focused solely on transactions in cyberspace would be too limited in 
scope to account for the realities of current wearable computing and internet technology. 
It is the combination of an image being recorded in a public place and having the image 
paired to information derived from the internet as well as tracking information that must 
be accounted for in an information privacy statute directed at wearable computers.    
A comprehensive information privacy statute should provide for an enforcement 
mechanism which would establish sanctions against violators and offer redress for 
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aggrieved individuals. Most effective would be legislation providing a private right cause 
of action for aggrieved individuals. Further, the statute should be designed to include an 
exemption for law enforcement who may need to use wearable computer technology to 
identify individuals and track their movements.347 And individuals with wearable 
computers that desire to film individuals in public places, should in some way provide a 
warning to individuals that they are being filmed, especially if the wearable computer has 
internet capabilities and the individuals image may be uploaded to the internet. Here the 
law would need to distinguish between what one would consider “background 
characters” in the video versus the subject of the filming. It would be onerous and 
unworkable to expect an individual to warn every potential person captured within the 
field of view of a camera lens that they were being filmed. In lieu of personally 
contacting each individual, perhaps the wearable computer itself could effect a warning, 
possibly in the form of an “on light” to indicate the individual was filming. A statute to 
account for the capabilities of wearable computers may also be written such that those 
individuals whose image is analyzed by facial recognition software must provide consent 
to being filmed in a public place if their image will be uploaded to the internet. Along 
these lines, given the reported benefits of wearable computers, for example, monitoring a 
person’s medical status or identifying the location of one’s kids, a person should have the 
ability to “opt in” and decide which personal information should be collected and who 
should be able to view it.348 If a person does “opt in” for certain applications, the 
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information privacy statute should prohibit the interception and use of the wireless signal 
by a third party for uses that violates an individual’s information privacy.  
In summary, the basic components of an information privacy statute designed to 
account for the capabilities of wearable computer technology should address the ability to 
analyze and recognize faces, post facial images on the internet, pair personal information 
to the posted image, and track an individual’s movements in a public place. 
 VII. CONCLUSIONS 
We live in a society where there is a shrinking level or personal privacy. For 
example, for a small price, one can purchase a month's worth of call information for just 
about anyone.349 These are very personal and private records of who an individual calls, 
when the call was made, and how long was spent on the telephone call. Similar levels of 
detailed private information can be accessed on the internet for either a small fee or for 
free. Even with such intrusive practices, wearable computers may result in an even 
greater loss of personal privacy than has occurred from use of the internet.350 Therefore, 
legislatures should address the privacy concerns that result from wearable computers, 
before the wearable computer technology develops even further to monitor and track 
individuals in public places.   
It should be noted that whether the use of technology which can record images 
and upload them to the internet, such as cell phones and video-based wearable computers, 
are desirable technology for a particular community is not only a question of law but also 
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a question of public policy. In that regard, in response to the growing use of cell phones 
images used for voyeuristic purposes, in West Lothian, Scotland, camera phones are 
banned at all secondary and primary schools to insure the safety and security of pupils.351 
The policy has been supported by the local teachers' association which fears that video 
images could be misused by pedophiles.352 While completing banning a technology at a 
school may be an appropriate means to solve a societal problem at a local level, in the 
case of wirelessly networked wearable computers a more comprehensive solution is 
called for, due to both privacy and safety concerns.  
When considering privacy in public places, the Fourth Amendment provides 
protection of individuals in public places only where they have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy from government intrusion. What happens when the filming of an individual in 
a public place is done by a private actor? In this case, the main causes of action stem 
from the classic article on privacy published by Warren and Brandeis in 1890353 and 
enumerated specifically in the 1960 article by Prosser.354 Both articles, and the case law 
presented in this article, highlight the fact that a central feature of privacy, is the notion of 
having a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in a particular space occupied by a person. 
However, as many of the cases presented in this article emphasized, once a person places 
themselves “in public,” much of their expectations for privacy disappear.  One can ask, is 
this result still reasonable in an age of wirelessly networked wearable computers 
equipped with facial recognitions software?  While the Supreme Court has stood steadfast 
to the notion of privacy in a public place depending on a rather restricted view of what 
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constitutes a reasonable expectation or privacy, the Federal and many State governments 
in enacting stricter privacy laws, and enacting new legislature to punish video voyeurism, 
have indicated a wiliness to expand the range of what constitutes a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in order to keep pace with technology developments. What is 
needed now is an ever greater expansion of the notion of what constitutes a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in public spaces. Currently, there are numerous bills being debated 
at the state and federal level, on just this topic.355 Therefore, while the future may be 
leading to a world where technology will be able to monitor, record, and analyze our 
every movement in public spaces, it is expected that laws will be enacted to provide some 
privacy protection, not only from government actors, but public actors as well, hopefully 
such laws will provide more protection for privacy in public places,356 and will focus on 
the capabilities of wirelessly networked wearable computers equipped with facial 
recognition software and other sensors. 
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